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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation:        Port State control: Review and assessment 
 
Degree:                                                       MSc 
 
The dissertation is a study of the effectiveness of port State control from a global 
perspective and its impact on the implementation of MARPLO and SOLAS, based 
on the information from IMO and several leading PSC MOUs as well as literatures 
from distinguished scholars.   
 
A brief retrospect is taken at the background of the emergence and development of 
the international PSC regime.  The definition of PSC and the main reasons, which 
triggered the development of the PSC regime all over the world, are examined. 
 
The legal basis for the port States to conduct PSC inspections is reviewed.  The 
provisions included in various international conventions, such as UNCLOS, SOLAS, 
MARPOL, STCW and so on, are examined so that people may have a clear idea of 
the legitimacy of the international PSC regime. 
 
The rationale, growth and development of regional PSC MOUs are investigated.  
Eight existing regional PSC MOUs and USCG are compared to gain a general view 
of their development status and performance.  The problems and defects existed in 
these MOUs are also investigated. 
 
The PSC inspection results from Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG are collated 
and evaluated in order to get a general idea of the world’s PSC regime performance.  
The effectiveness, limitation, fairness and cost-effectiveness of PSC are also 
examined. 
 
The impact of PSC on the implementation of SOLAS and MARPOL is assessed 
mainly based on the inspection results from the Paris MOU during the last decades 
because of the limitation of availability of information.  
 
The concluding chapter provide some recommendations and proposals, which may 
be useful in improving the effectiveness of the PSC regime.  A conclusion was made 
that the PSC is a supplement to the flag State control. It is not yet effective enough to 
eliminate the substandard ships running around the world.  The responsibility of flag 
States, shipowners and other industry players should never be neglected. 
 
 
 
Key words:  port State control, effectiveness, impact, flag State control, safety,  
MOU.  
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Chapter 1        
Introduction 
 
In the last several decades, the world has seen great advances in the public 
international law concerning safety at sea and marine environment protection.  There 
exists a comprehensive legal regime regulating almost all aspects of the conduct of 
ships at sea.  It has been developed mainly through conventions, such as UNCLOS 
82, SOLAS74, MARPOL73/78, LL, Tonnage 69, STCW 95, ILO147, which are 
concluded by UN, IMO and ILO in order to improve the safety of ships, protecting 
the marine environment from ship-source pollution and raising the standards of 
crewing, training and accommodation on board ships.  Conventions adopted in IMO 
account for the majority of conventions responsible for the safety at sea and marine 
environmental protection.  A summary of status of IMO conventions is given in 
Table 1 in the Appendix B.  It is generally agreed that conventions, even though they 
are widely accepted, would be effective only when they are effectively implemented 
and strictly enforced. (Sasamura, 2000)   
However, many of these conventions are neither widely ratified nor as 
effectively enforced as is necessary to ensure the achievement of the goal of “Safer 
Ships and Cleaner Ocean”.  This is attributable to the long-standing supremacy of 
Flag State implementation (FSI).  According to international law, it is the 
responsibility of the flag States to make sure that ships flying their flags are 
constructed, equipped, maintained and operated to comply with the standards laid 
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down by the relevant international organization.  Unfortunately, certain flag States 
fail to fulfil their commitments contained in agreed international legal instruments 
for various reasons.  Other tiers of control, which are also responsible for the ship 
safety, such as shipowners, classification societies, charterers frequently fail their 
obligations in ensuring the safe operation of ships.  Subsequently, some ships are 
sailing around the world in unsafe condition, threatening the lives of all those on 
board as well as the marine environment.  The booming of flag of convenience, 
where the Flag States may neither have available resources nor have the true 
intention to enforce these conventions they have ratified, makes the situation even 
worse.  
The failure of all these tiers of control in preventing the operation of substandard 
ships agonize the international maritime regime.  People realized that a back up 
system has to be established to eradicate these substandard ships, which have escape 
from other tiers of control.  Attention has thus increasingly been paid in the last two 
decades to the role that can be played by the port State, which means the State whose 
port a vessel voluntarily enters, in enforcing international conventions or regulations 
ratified by the State.  Several major pollution accidents happened in the late 70s and 
early 80s triggered the emergence of port State control (PSC), which really has 
attracted the world attention since the establishment of Paris MOU.  
It should be pointed out that the PSC is never meant to be the first line of 
defence for eliminating sub-standard ships but a supplement to what some flag States 
fail to achieve.  It usually enforces the same requirements imposed by relevant 
international conventions as mentioned for the flag State control without adding any 
additional requirements on foreign flag merchant shipping. (Hoopen, 1998) 
 The legal basis of PSC has been incorporated in the provisions of UNCLOS and 
other major conventions developed mainly by IMO and ILO, which enable the port 
States to inspect foreign vessels entering their ports or offshore terminals.    
The important role PSC could play in eliminating substandard ships was 
recognized soon after the adoption of control procedures by the IMO Assembly in 
1975. (Sasamura, 2000)  The world began to move toward establishing a uniform 
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approach on regional basis on the implementation of the control provisions under 
various conventions on maritime safety, pollution prevention and working and living 
condition on board ships.  The first and most important regional PSC agreement 
concluded was the Paris MOU, which was signed on 26 January 1982 and came into 
operation on July 1982.  Since then, the world PSC regime has been developed very 
rapidly.  So far seven other PSC MOUs have been signed, which cover most coast 
States of the world, even though the performance of the different MOUs varies 
significantly.  
The PSC regime has gained world recognition as an alternative to eliminate 
substandard ships.  However, some questions have always been under debate by the 
international maritime regime, such as the effectiveness of PSC, its impact on the   
implementation of the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, and what we can do to 
improve the performance of PSC.  In this dissertation, I have tried to answer these 
questions based on the information available mainly from the inspection results from 
Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG during the past decades.   The research is 
primary based on the literatures of distinguished scholars and other documents from 
IMO as well as the above-mentioned three MOUs.  The main difficulty encountered 
in this research is the lack of information from PSC inspections except the Paris 
MOU.  Therefore, the analysis in this dissertation may not reflect the whole picture 
of the world PSC regime. 
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Chapter 2  
The Background of Port State Control 
 
Introduction 
Historically, the control over ships mainly relies on the flag State.  The other 
tiers of control of ships, such as shipowners, classification societies and insurers are 
all responsible for the safe operation of ships.  Theoretically, these several tiers of 
control should act as a perfect net in preventing substandard ships from operation.  
However, for various reasons, this net has not worked so well as was expected.  A 
back up system, which is now widely known as PSC, was established in order to 
achieve the goal of “safer shipping and cleaner seas”.  
 
2.1 Flag State Supremacy 
The flag State is the State whose nationality is held by a ship.  In international 
customary maritime law, the flag State has the primary jurisdiction over ships flying 
its flag, which is a principle based on the assumption that a ship is a floating part of 
the flag State’s territory.  Historically, international law as well as the shipping 
community relied mainly on flag States to maintain safety over the ships flying their 
flags. (United Nation, 1998)  This principle is clarified in Article 92 of the UNCLOS 
(1982), which provides that: “Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, 
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this 
Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas”.  The 
Article 94 of this Convention requires that “Every State shall effectively exercise its 
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jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships 
flying its flag”.  The flag state is required to take such measures that each ship is 
appropriately surveyed as to condition, equipment and manning to ensure ships 
flying its flag are safe at sea and environment friendly.  In addition, a duty is 
imposed on flag States to take any steps necessary to secure observance with 
generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices, which is 
further repeated in relation to oil pollution in Article 217.  The concept of flag State 
control is also embodied in all of the 30-odd maritime conventions and 700 or so 
related codes and regulations, which have been developed by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) since its beginning in 1959 in response to the growing 
awareness of the need for internationally accepted, effective and enforceable 
maritime safety and environmental standards for shipping. (Williamson, 1996) 
Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships 
(1986) says that:  
A flag state should have a competent and adequate national maritime 
administration…the maritime administration of the flag States shall ensure 
that ships flying the flag of such State comply with its laws and regulations 
concerning registration of ships and with applicable international rules and 
standards concerning, in particular the safety of ships and persons on board 
and the prevention of pollution of the marine environment.   
Furthermore, its authorized surveyors should periodically survey such ships in order 
to ensure compliance with applicable international rules and standards.  
Generally speaking, the flag State has the supreme responsibility and obligation 
to regulate the ships flying its flag.  For a flag State who has acceded or ratifed a 
international convention, the flag State is legally bound by the convention and is 
obliged to establish legislation, such as Shipping Acts, Decrees, Guidelines and 
Instructions, to implement its provisions.  These obligations are mainly fulfilled 
through the way of issuing certificates indicating compliance with the main 
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international conventions by the flag State or organizations on behalf of the flag 
State. (Hare, 1995)  Flag States must also ensure themselves that their own ships 
have priority, which means that flag States must keep their own fleets in compliance 
with the relevant international conventions and regulations before they check others. 
(Ulstrup, 2001) 
Theoretically, flag State control was the ideal mechanism to implement those 
standards, which have been developed for the protection of seafarers, passengers, 
cargo owners, the environment and responsible ship owners.  There will be no 
necessity for the PSC to back up the system if the flag States had really enforced the 
safe operation of the ships entitled to fly their flags. (Williamson, 1996) 
 
2.2 Expansion of Coastal State Jurisdiction 
Coastal State is the State within whose maritime zone a foreign ship is for the 
time being.  According to international law, any state having a coastline is entitled to 
take certain limited steps to protect its own interests. (Hare, 1995) 
According to UNCLOS (1982), the maritime zones under the jurisdiction of 
coastal State mainly include the following four zones: Internal waters, Territorial 
Sea, Contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), within which the coastal 
State has varying jurisdiction power.  A foreign ship is entitled to enjoy free passage 
outside the Territorial Sea, while inside the Territorial Sea the ship is limited to 
innocent passage as long as the voyage is kept innocent.  According to Article 24 of 
UNCLOS (1982), the innocent passage of foreign ships through the Territorial Sea 
shall not be hampered, nevertheless it is by no means absolute.  International law, 
through UNCLOS (1982) Article 21, provides coastal States specific powers to adopt 
laws and regulations, in conformity with international laws, which may limit the 
right of innocent passage through the Territorial Sea.  The coastal State may regulate 
the safety of navigation, maritime traffic, protection of navigational aids, facilities, 
cables and pipelines, conservation of the living resources of the sea, prevention of 
infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State, marine 
scientific research and hydrographic surveys, prevention of infringement of the 
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customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.  As 
far as pollution is concerned, the coastal State may regulate the preservation of the 
environment of the coastal State and prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
thereof.  This authority provided to the coastal State may also extend to the EEZ 
according to the UNCLOS Article 211, provided that they conform to and give effect 
to generally accepted international rules and standards.  All such laws and 
regulations must be given due publicity by the coastal State to enable foreign ships to 
comply with. 
The coastal State may inspect foreign ships following generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices according to Article 94.  In 
exercising its rights, a coastal State should make sure that it does not go beyond 
internationally accepted norms of interference with foreign vessels, both from a 
perspective of comity and to remain within the limit of reality and practicality.   
Stopping a vessel during its voyage within the Territorial Sea is a drastic and 
potentially dangerous exercise. (Hare, 1995)  On the whole, coastal state intervention 
to foreign ships within its maritime zone is limited in scope, and should be limited in 
use.   However, some superpowers may challenge these norms in practice.   
 
2.3 Impetus for the emergence of PSC 
PSC is not necessary if the flag States and other tiers of control have fulfilled 
their obligations in ensuring the safety of ships and environmental protection.  
However, the deteriorating ship casualty records and increasing number of 
substandard ships make it unavoidable for the port States to strengthening their 
control over foreign ships in order to protect their own interests, particularly their 
marine environment.   Generally speaking, factors contributing to the booming of the 
PSC regime can mainly be categorized as the growth of flag of convenience, the 
environment protection concern and the failure of other checks on safety and 
pollution prevention. (Rial, 2000) 
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2.3.1 Growth of flag of convenience  
The nationality of a vessel comes from the country under whose flag it is 
registered.  According to the regulation stipulated by the 1958 High Seas (HS) 
Convention (1958), each State is entitled to set its own conditions of registry.  There 
was not any international convention on the registration of, or on the granting of 
nationality to merchant vessels until the United Nations Convention on the 
Conditions for Registration of Ships was adopted in 1986.  This lack of international 
law and control was one of the main elements in tempting some small countries to set 
up their open registry fleets in order to make revenue by attracting significant amount 
of tonnage to their registries without providing adequate administrative or 
governmental facilities for regulation and enforcing the necessary standards at sea. 
(Kasoulides, 1993, p76)  
There are many factors promoting the growth of these flags of convenience 
(FOC).  From the flag State point of view, there are three main reasons to set up open 
registry (Rial, 2000):  
1. The State has the ability to offer fiscal/tax concessions; 
2. Attracting foreign ships to be registered under its flag can be a good 
source of revenue, though the profits are often maximized at the expense 
of little or no resources returned to the system to implement flag State 
control effectively; 
3. Initial ineffective PSC makes it possible to continue this situation. 
The Owners’/Operators’ initiative in taking the advantage of open registry 
became the main impetus element in the growth of FOC.  From the 
Owners’/Operator’ point of view, there are several reasons for them to shift their 
maritime activities from their own country to a FOC (Rial, 2000): 
1. Fiscal reasons, such as very low or no taxation policy; wage level and 
social security requirements are relatively low; freedom to man crews of 
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any nationality in the cheapest market; freedom in raising or transferring 
capital; freedom to buy, sell or charter ships; 
2. Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted; 
3. No interest in exercising responsible and effective control over vessel 
construction, operation, certification of personnel qualifications, crew 
training and social conditions enables the less responsible operators to run 
substandard ships under FOC (Kasoulides, 1993, p76-88). 
The Classification Societies also welcomed and promoted the development of 
the FOC in some way.  It is the Classification Societies that provided most of the 
statutory survey and certification work, which most of the FOC States do not have 
the expertise and capacity to do so themselves.  On the other hand, it is the 
Classification Societies that benefit from providing the service of survey and 
certification, which sustains and promotes the development of their own business. 
The adoption of the UNCTAD Convention on Ship Registration in 1986 tried to 
regulate the registration of ships through the way of international legislation. 
However, its attempt to “grasp the nettle” regarding State responsibility and “genuine 
link” with the ship failed, (Rial, 2000) which makes the FOC continuing to exist.   
The safety performance of world fleets should be quite uniform if all flag States 
enforce the requirements of international conventions with equal vigor.  However, 
experience shows that most FOCs neither have the political will nor financial muscle 
and maritime knowhow to properly discharge those obligations.  Furthermore, the 
fierce competition between the FOC States for registrations, which is not the case for 
most non-open registry States, makes them very unlikely to raise their level of 
enforcement by their own incentives.  The owners who are not fully committed to 
quality but instead seeking to operate substandard ships are likely to be attracted by 
these flags, and by class societies not committed to performing well. (Blenkey, N. 
1994)  Hopefully, the flourishing PSC regime will make these States more difficult 
to run without proper enforcement of the international standards. 
 10
 
2.3.2 Failure of other checks on safety and pollution 
prevention 
2.3.2.1 Flag State implementation 
It is understood that the flag State has the primary responsibility to implement 
international standards, which is an obligation imposed upon the flag State when the 
State acceded or ratified international conventions.  However, many flag States have 
failed to implement international standards either because some States do not have 
maritime administrations with systems in place to enforce the relevant conventions 
they have signed, or because other States simply lack the will to enforce the 
obligations they have signed up to. (Williamson, 1996)  With regard to the FOC, the 
existing regime of registration of vessels permit registration in States with no 
genuine link with the vessels and no effective powers of enforcement, since these 
vessels hardly have the opportunity to call at ports of these States, nor has that State 
the necessary infrastructure, administrative power and resources to implement and 
enforce existing international obligations or punish offences committed elsewhere. 
(Kasoulides, 1993)  The increasing failure of the flag State control regime has led to 
the increased strengthening of the role of the port State as a policing mechanism for 
the shipping industry and a back up system for flag State control. 
The lack of ratification of some essential conventions by flag States especially 
those small developing countries also weaken the flag State implementation regime.  
Convention standards can be effectively implemented only when accepted 
extensively by the world.  On the other hand, it is a sine qua non condition for a State 
to be party to a relevant convention in order to be able to enforce it on a visiting 
foreign ship.  The effectiveness of port State control in a particular region will be 
compromised until such time as the majority of the participating countries of a PSC 
agreement have ratified and are able to effectively implement the relevant 
instruments.   
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Establishing an efficient and effective maritime administration is essential to 
fulfill the flag State obligations imposed by the relevant international conventions.  
In this respect, the European Commission has set a very good example by taking the 
initiative in trying to ensure that the necessary administrative structures for flag 
states are in place in the relevant applicant countries as part of the ongoing EU 
accession negotiations. In the year 2000, IMO introduced a Flag State Self 
Assessment Form to assist countries in determining weak points in their 
administrations (INTERTANKO, 2000).  The establishment of the FSI sub-
committee in IMO, which specifically addresses matters relating to the 
implementation of the IMO conventions, is also an important initiative from IMO to 
promote flag State implementation.  All these initiatives will surely improve the 
performance of the FSI, which will in turn improve the whole quality level of the 
shipping industry. 
 
2.3.2.2. Failure of Owner/Operator control 
It is self-evident that the owners have a primary responsibility in keeping their 
vessels in good condition complying with relevant international standards and 
carrying the duty of care every day, around the clock.  However, during the past 30 
years, the world fleets have undergone a significant change.  Today, there is a highly 
fragmented pattern of vessel operation and ownership.  The fleet is ageing and more 
vulnerable, facing intense market pressures that often seem to favor not the “quality” 
operators, but the cheap carriers. (Mathiesen, 1998)  Shipowners tend to pay more 
and more attention to the economical aspects rather than the safety of their ships.  
Furthermore, lots of shipowners choose to register their ships in FOC so that they can 
have a more free choice of manning and usually a looser flag State control, which 
may enable them to run their ships in a substandard manner.  It is essential that 
measures should be taken so that shipowners will have their own initiatives to keep 
their ships complying with international standards. 
The ISM Code, which entried into force on 1 July 1998 for some categories of 
ships, marks a milestone in enhancing the shipowner responsibility in ensuring the 
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safety of ships and pollution prevention for the first time on a statutory basis.  At the 
same time, the code enables the port States to scrutinize the performance of the 
shipowner.   
 
2.3.2.3 Role of Classification Societies 
Classification rules started to be developed more than 200 years ago with the 
aims of providing service for the benefit of shipowners and insurance companies.  
They define the “fitness for purpose” design, construction and lifetime maintenance 
of standards for a ship’s structure and its essential engineering and electrical systems, 
which are an important foundation for all those concerned with safer ships and 
cleaner seas.   
    In the management of ship safety and pollution prevention, the Classification 
Societies hold a unique position not only because the class roles are enshrined in the 
relevant convention, but also because their role is delegated by many flag states in 
ensuring the ships flying the flag of these States are complying with the international 
standards and national legislation.  The ISM Code enshrines the Class rules on 
structural and engineering “fitness for the purpose” recognized as the fundamental 
basis of the international maritime regulation. (Mathiesn, 1998)  The SOLAS 
Convention makes it conditional on conformance with the structural and mechanical 
rules and standards of a vessel’s classification society for ships to comply with its 
safety standards.  In this respect, the International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS), which is composed of several of the most prominent classification 
societies, play a key role in keeping the ships classed within these member societies 
complying with international standards.  So far, well over 100 IMO member States 
have delegated a majority of their statutory surveying and certification to the IACS 
members.  The classification societies therefore work for the ship owner, for 
individual Flag Administrations and in close partnership with the IMO, which 
obviously became a vital partner in the regulation of the shipping industry. 
(Mathiesen, 1998)    
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On the whole, classification societies, especially the members of IACS, do their 
job well and have gained world fame in the shipping industry in ensuring the safety 
and quality of shipping.  However, experience shows that some classification 
societies failed to do their job properly for various reasons.  One of the main reasons 
may be that they face high pressure in competing for their market shares.  Some 
societies may be tempted to lower their class requirements in order to get more ships 
classed.  Lots of accidents, which happened to ships classed by major members of 
the IACS, show that what they have done is not good enough. (Stoneley, 1999)  
Lloyds Register and DNV, BV and the Polish Register have sometimes faced (and 
hotly disputed) allegations that their surveyors sell forged safety certificates. (Hare, 
1995)  The accident of the Erika, which indicates the deficiencies in their routine 
jobs, makes people suspect their credibility in ensuring that ships are complying with 
international standards.       
Something good to notice is that IACS has realized the seriousness of the 
situation and has taken some strong actions to improve the quality of the class 
regime, in which the most drastic action that has ever been taken is the suspending of 
the membership of the Polish Register who has been claimed being involved in some 
scandals and poor quality in fulfilling its jobs.  The IACS member societies also 
agreed to implement a number of measures aimed at identifying substandard ships 
and removing them from service.  These include more intensive inspection for older 
ships changing class; the computerization of class records and the transfer of these to 
new societies. (INTERTANKO, 2000)  These measures have been welcomed by the 
industry and will surely improve its quality in ensuring the safety of ships and 
pollution prevention.  However, there are still around 10 percent of the world fleets 
classed with non-IACS members and their quality systems are quite possibly worse.   
 
2.3.2.4 Cargo interests/Charterers 
The Cargo interests/Charterers have an obligation to recognize and support 
quality shipping by doing everything in their powers to identify substandard ships 
and avoid using them in their business.   
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The contribution of the Cargos/Charterers can be extremely significant in 
weeding out substandard ships if they can take more safety and quality consideration 
into account when they are considering their commercial interests.  They can 
contribute to the safety regime by tightening their vetting and approval procedures. 
In addition, they can contribute in making a commitment to improved standards and 
criteria by introducing greater transparency into their chartering arrangements. 
(INTERTANKO, 2000)  Without the cooperation of the Cargo interests/Charterers 
cooperation, the substandard ships can just not survive. 
  However, the real world does not seem to be so good as expected.  Many 
Charterers are more interested in hiring the cheapest ship available in the market 
rather than the safety condition of the ship.  As the shipping market has been in a 
quite bad situation most of the time during the last two decades, it is hardly possible 
to rely them to take too much attention to the quality.  One feasible way of solving 
this problem is to expose the public to those Cargo interests/Charterers who have 
used or tried to use substandard ships or ships managed by poor quality shipping 
companies. 
 
2.3.2.5 Insurers, Ship Management Companies 
It is quite obvious that the insurers of ships should conduct proper inspection of 
the ships they want to insure, as this is for the benefit of the insurers themselves.  
Nevertheless, it looks like the insurers did not conduct their inspections properly, 
which has been indicated in lots of accident resulting in huge claims to insurers, 
partly because of the increasingly fierce market competition.  
Ship management companies are often contracted to handle the day-to-day 
operation of a vessel, which is very important in the daily safety management of a 
vessel.  However, a potential situation for corner cutting in ship safety exists since 
this is also a competitive market.  Similarly, the recruitment of crews is often 
contracted out to crewing agents in the usual practice, which may lead to the 
possibility of compromising the quality of crew. (Rial, 2000)  Unscrupulous 
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management of all these parties surely has a negative impact on the quality of the 
shipping industry. 
 
2.3.3 Impetus from concerns over the marine environment 
People’s concern towards the marine environment has increased especially 
during the last several decades.  One reason is that the loss of one single oil tanker 
and its cargo can cause tremendous economic loss, such as the “Exxon Valdez” 
accident in Alaska in 1989, the most costly marine mistake that ever happened, 
where $5 billion claims have been generated so far.  Another reason is that people 
care about the life at sea and the marine environment but often with decidedly 
misdirected priorities.  There have been too many cases where people are outraged 
by the mess on their beaches and oil stained seabirds following a maritime casualty.  
But the tragic loss of life, which frequently accompanies pollution, is always 
neglected by much of the media in its quest for the most newsworthy elements of a 
marine disaster. (Williamson, 1996) 
 In the late 1960’s there were several serious oil pollution accidents.  The most 
memorable is the disaster of the ‘Torry Canyon’, which grounded and lost almost 
120,000 tonnes of oil off the Scilly Islands, UK in 1967. (Bowring, 2000)  These 
high profile oil pollution incidents increased the awareness of the need to protect the 
maritime environment by eradicating substandard ships, which have been the main 
factors leading to most of the accidents.  States having a large interest in the 
protection of their marine environment began to think about extending the powers of 
coastal or port States and to change the traditional powers of the dominant flag States 
for legislating ship standards. (Kasoulides, 1993, pp113)  As a response, the IMO 
developed the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), which enables the 
coastal States to intervene on the high seas in oil pollution emergencies.  In addition, 
the resulting International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(1969) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971) established a meaningful 
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civil liability and compensation regime for oil pollution damage.  Finally, in 1973 a 
significant breakthrough came when the international Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, usually referred to as MARPOL, was adopted by IMO, 
which enshrined the concept of Port State Control in international law.  Following 
this convention, the port States were provided the right to inspect ships and report 
their deficiencies to the flag State and to detain ships until deficiencies were rectified 
(Williamson, 1996). 
 
2.4 PSC entrenched through UNCLOS 
The concept of PSC was finally entrenched in the part XII of UNCLOS.  Article 
25 of the UNCLOS (1982) empowered States whose ports were used by vessels to 
take necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions by vessels calling at 
their ports.  Article 216 and 218 enable a port State to enforce international anti-
dumping and anti-pollution measures.  In addition, States are required by Article 219 
to take administrative measures to prevent errant vessels from sailing.  Legitimacy 
for PSC inspections may be found in these Articles of UNCLOS because a pollution 
threat always exists, although only bunkers from any unseaworthy ship.  The only 
limitation is that the steps taken should be reasonable, public, and not discriminatory 
(Hare, 1994).  Except UNCLOS, there are a lot of other conventions that provide 
most maritime authorities more modern, effective and direct powers of PSC 
inspection, which includes: SOLAS, MARPOL, the Loadline Convention, the 
Registration of Ships and the STCW Convention.  All these conventions give powers 
(and duties) of inspection to ensure compliance.  
 
2.5 Concept emerged as early as SOLAS 1929 
Even though the PSC concept looks relatively new to the shipping industry and 
unfamiliar to most people outside the shipping regime, though much publicized in 
recent years, it is by no means a new idea.  It was actually built into the 1929 SOLAS 
Convention.  However, it was not really used as a tool in eliminating substandard 
ships until the establishment of the Paris PSC MOU where countries in Europe 
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decided to take advantage of PSC as an effective tool in eradicating substandard 
shipping and protecting their own interest.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The PSC is not a new concept.  But it became known to the world only recently 
when the international maritime regime realized that something has to be done to 
improve the quality of the shipping industry.  So far, PSC has been recognized as a 
normal practice to eliminate substandard ships.  However, many people still are not 
clear about the legal basis of the PSC, which is very important to the port States if 
they want to conduct PSC in a proper and legitimized way.    
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Chapter 3     
The legal background of PSC 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Hare (1997), the concept of PSC involves:  
The powers and concomitant obligations vested in, exercised by, and imposed 
upon a national maritime authority (or its delegee) by international 
convention or domestic statute or both, to board, inspect and where 
appropriate detain, a merchant ship flying a flag foreign to that State in order 
to ensure compliance by that ship with all applicable international safety at 
sea instruments and with any domestic legislative maritime safety 
requirements. 
The emergence of the PSC concept seems to give the international maritime 
community a hope for a possible solution to the problem of substandard ships.  It 
may not be a real solution, but rather one of the more positive steps being taken. 
(Hare, 1994) 
The legal basis of PSC is established in most of the major IMO conventions, 
such as MARPOL 73/78, SOLAS, STCW and LL.  The “blue print” for the PSC 
regime is prescribed in UNCLOS in respect of pollution from ships.  PSC is 
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primarily exercised by inspection of certificates as a corrective measure, which aims 
at correcting non-compliance or non-effective flag State enforcement.  Only if there 
are “clear grounds”, can physical inspection of a ship and its equipment may take 
place.  However, according to the new SOLAS regulation, since 1996 operational 
requirements can be checked if there are clear grounds that the crew is not familiar 
with essential shipboard procedures.  If any PSC actions need to be taken after 
inspection, the flag State must be informed especially in case of detention.  Any 
undue delay of unjustified detention may lead to civil liability. (Mukherjee, 2000) 
 
3.2 UNCLOS 82 
UNCLOS (82) is recognized as the umbrella convention for most of the other 
conventions concerning maritime safety and marine environmental protection.  There 
are a lot of creative contributions in its latest version especially in part XII regarding 
“Protection and preservation of the marine environment”, among which the most 
important innovations may be the entrenchment of the concept of PSC jurisdiction 
for the enforcement of international rules and standards concerning pollution of the 
marine environment from vessels.  This innovation supplements the traditional 
jurisdiction of flag State and greatly strengthens the capability of the international 
community to enforce these rules and standards.   
The concept of PSC is embodied in several provisions in this convention.  
Article 25 empowers States whose ports were used by vessels to take necessary steps 
to prevent any breach of the conditions for vessels calling at its ports.  Article 218, 
which concerns the enforcement by port States, says that ship is subject to 
investigations when it is voluntarily within a port or at an offshore terminal of a 
State.  Article 219 requires states to take administrative measures to prevent errant 
vessels from sailing.   These provisions provide the legal basis for a port State to 
carry out PSC activities.  Article 226, which concerns the investigations of foreign 
vessels, provides that foreign ships must not be delayed longer than is essential for 
purposes of investigation.  Physical inspection must be limited to “an examination of 
such certificates, records or other documents the vessel is required to carry by 
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generally accepted international rules and standards or of any similar documents it is 
carrying”.  However, further physical inspection may be undertaken when: 
 (i) there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the vessel or its 
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of those 
documents; (ii) the contents of such documents are not sufficient to confirm 
or verify a suspected violation; (iii) the vessel is not carrying valid certificates 
and records.  
Further more, ship must not be released whenever it will present an unreasonable 
threat of damage to the marine environment, or made conditional upon proceeding to 
the nearest appropriate repair yard.  The second part of this Article, which says that 
“States shall cooperate to develop procedures for the avoidance of unnecessary 
physical inspection of vessels at sea”, provides the legal basis of the regional PSC 
memorandum of understanding (MOU). 
 
3.3 MARPOL 73/78 
MARPOL 73/78 Convention covers all the aspects of pollution from ships, 
including pollution by oil, noxious liquid substances in bulk, harmful substances 
carried by sea in packaged forms, sewage, garbage and the control of air pollution, 
except disposal of land generated wastes into the sea by dumping and pollution 
arising out of the exploration and exploitation of sea-bed mineral resources.  The 
Convention applies to all ships engaged in commercial trading. 
The control provision lies in Article 5 of the Convention (1997), which 
authorises port States to verify that there are valid certificates on board ships in ports 
or at offshore terminals.  Further steps must be taken to ensure that the ship will not 
sail until it can proceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to 
the marine environment when there are clear grounds for believing that the condition 
of the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of 
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that certificate.  The “No more favourable treatment” (NMFT) Clause applies to 
ships of non-parties to the Convention. 
The provisions of PSC on operational requirements are provided in respective 
Annex, which make it possible for a port State control officer (PSCO) to inspect 
operational requirements where there are clear grounds for believing that the master 
or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment. 
 
3.4 SOLAS 74 
SOLAS 74 Convention is recognized as the most important convention 
concerning the safety of ships and the people onboard. It lays down a comprehensive 
range of minimum standards for the safe construction of ships and for the basic 
safety equipment (e.g. fire prevention, navigational, life-saving and radio) to be 
carried on board.  It also contains operational instructions, particularly on emergency 
procedures, and provides for regular surveys and certificates of compliance.  The 
convention mainly applies to all passenger ships irrespective of size and all cargo 
ships of a gross tonnage of 500 and over engaged on international voyages.  
However, exceptions from the 500gt limit exist, for example, Chapter V concerning 
“Safety of Navigation” and Chapter VI concerning “Carriage of Cargoes” apply to 
all ships, and Chapter VII “Carriage of Dangerous Goods” also applies to ships with 
a gross tonnage less than 500. 
Regulation 19 of Chapter I is the legal basis for PSC according to this 
convention, which contains a right but not an obligation for port States to verify that 
there are valid safety certificates held by the ship. (Ulstrup, 2001)  The certificates 
should be accepted unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of 
the ship or of its equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of 
relevant certificates.  Regulation 6 of Chapter IX concerns PSC on operational 
requirements with regard to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, in 
particular the proper functioning of the ship’s Safety Management System. 
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According to the new Regulation 4 of Chapter XI of the Convention, it is now 
also possible for PSCOs to inspect foreign ships for checking operational 
requirements “when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are 
not familiar with essential ship board procedures relating to the safety of ships”.  The 
focus is on the crew's ability to carry out safety functions on board ships.  This new 
idea is a deviation from the previous constraints of PSC inspection, which was that 
they should normally be limited to checking certificates and documents. (Hare, 1997) 
With respect to the ships of non-parties to the Convention, the NMFT Clause 
should be applied according to Article II of the Protocol of 1978. 
 
3.5 LL 1966  
The LL Convention establishes uniform principles and rules regarding the limits 
to which ships on international voyages may be loaded in the form of freeboard, 
which should ensure adequate stability and avoid excessive stress on the ship’s hull 
as a result of overloading.  It deals with external weathertight and watertight 
integrity.  Provisions are made for determining the freeboard of tankers including 
regulations for subdivision and damage stability calculations.  For the structural 
strength requirement, the convention makes a reference to the requirements of the 
Classification Societies.   
This Convention applies to all ships engaged in international voyages, except for 
ships of war, new ships less than 24 metres in length, existing ships of a gross 
tonnage less than 150, pleasure yachts not engaged in trade and fishing vessels. 
According to Article 21 of the Convention (1966), ships holding valid Load Line 
certificates are subject to control by officers, duly authorised by the local 
government, when in the port of other contracting governments.  Such control should 
be exercised as far as is reasonable and practicable with a view to verifying that there 
is a valid certificate on board and the contents stipulated in the certificate are 
complied with.  Strangely enough, there is no NMFT Clause in this Convention.  
However, the privileges of the convention may not be claimed in favour of any ship 
unless it holds a valid certificate under the convention. 
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3.6 STCW 78/95 
The STCW78/95 Convention (1996) establishes comprehensive certification and 
qualification requirements for senior officers, all officers in charge of watches on the 
deck and engine departments and ratings forming part of a watch on an international 
level.  All such seafarers are required to have a certificate endorsed in a uniform 
manner.  The Convention applies to seafarers serving on board seagoing ships 
entitled to fly the flag of a party except for those serving on board warships, fishing 
vessels, pleasure yachts not engaged in trade and wooden ships of primitive build. 
The control regulation is in Article X of the Convention, which authorizes 
PSCOs to verify that: 
All seafarers serving on board who are required to be certificated by the 
Convention are so certificated or hold an appropriate dispensation.  Such 
certificates shall be accepted unless there are clear grounds for believing that 
a certificate has been fraudulently obtained or that the holder of a certificate 
is not the person to whom that certificate was originally issued. 
The NMFT clause is also included in this article.  With the 1995 amendment, the 
general provisions of Chapter I provide enhanced procedures concerning the exercise 
of PSC, which have been developed to allow intervention in the case of deficiencies 
deemed to pose a danger to persons, property or the environment. (Ulstrup, 2001) 
 
3.7 Tonnage 1969 
The Tonnage (1969) Convention establishes a universal system of tonnage 
measurement for ships engaged in international voyage.  It applies to ships of more 
than 24 metres in length engaged in international voyages except ships of war.  
There is an “inspection” article in Article 12 of the Convention (1969) for the 
verification of the Tonnage Certificate.  The Convention is not regarded as a “safety 
convention”, and it is seldom mentioned or used in connection with PSC. (Ulstrup, 
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2001).  However, as the ship’s tonnage is important to determine which convention 
regulations are applicable to a specific ship, the latest revision of resolution A.787 
(19) concerning procedures for PSC added guidelines for PSC under the Tonnage 
Convention to the procedures.  
 
3.8 ILO 147 
The ILO 147 Convention is mainly a flag State instrument, which requires 
administrations to have effective legislation on safe manning standards, hours of 
work, seafarers’ competency, social security and sets of employment standards 
equivalent to those contained in a range of ILO instruments (covering eg. minimum 
age, medical examination, accident prevention, crew accommodation, repatriation, 
social security and training). (Ulstrup, 2001)  The Convention applies to every sea-
going ship engaged in the transport of cargo or passengers for the purpose of trade or 
is employed for any other commercial purpose. 
The control provision is contained in Article 4, which allows an administration 
to apply its provisions (including the power of detention) to any ship, which calls at 
its ports, whether or not the ship’s flag State has ratified the Convention.  Based on 
their professional judgement, PSCOs should decide whether clearly hazardous 
conditions on board warrant a detention of the ship until any deficiency is corrected, 
or allow it to sail with certain deficiencies that are not clearly hazardous to the safety 
of the ship or to the safety and health of the crew.  In the case of detention, the port 
State authorities should, as soon as possible, notify the flag State through its nearest 
maritime consular of diplomatic representative of the action taken and, as far as 
possible, have such a representative present. 
 
3.9 Ships of non-parties 
One of the PSC principles is that the port State recognizes international 
certificates issued by or on behalf of the flag State.  It should be realised that such 
recognition is a privilege extended only to Parties to conventions.  Non-parties are 
not entitled to issue these certificates, even though the Administrations of non-Party 
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States may issue, or authorize to issue certificates of compliance with the relevant 
provisions of conventions to their ships.  The PSCO may take the form and content 
of these documents into account in the evaluation of these ships. An NMFT clause 
usually exists in a number of conventions, which have been mentioned above.  In 
principle, the conditions of such ships and their equipment, the certification of the 
crew and the flag State’s minimum manning standard should be consistent with the 
aims of the provisions of the conventions, or the ships should at least have a 
comparable level of safety and protection of the marine environment. (Hoppe, 2000) 
 
3.10 PSC on non-convention size ships 
Most maritime conventions have progressive limits of application for each 
category of size of ships in terms of tonnage, length or other ship parameters, and 
also of the construction time of the vessel and the trading area in some conventions.  
The limits of application involve ships certificates or even their equipment, which 
means that some ships may not necessary hold certain kinds of certificate or even be 
exempted from some design or equipment requirements.  However, these ships are 
not exempted from being safe and environmental friendly.  PSCOs should use their 
professional judgement to assess these ships whether they are of an acceptable 
standard with regard to safety, health or the environment, taking due account of such 
factors as the length and nature of the intended voyage or service, the size and type 
of the ship, the equipment provided and the nature of the cargo.  Usually these ships 
are constructed following the flag State requirements, which may not be familiar to 
the PSCO who may have to use his discretion in assessing these ships, possibly with 
the assistance of some forms of certification issued by the flag State or on its behalf.  
PSCOs should take due action including detention to make sure these ships will not 
be allowed to sail with unreasonable hazard to safety, health or the environment. 
(Hoppe, 2000) 
Some regional PSC MOUs have achieved some good results in regulating ships 
of non-convention size.  The Tokyo MOU has developed the Asia-Pacific Small Ship 
Regulations and a similar set of rules has also been developed in the South Pacific 
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Island countries.  The Caribbean MOU has successfully developed the Caribbean 
Cargo Ship Safety Code, which is recognized by the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG).  This is extremely important in maintaining the proper trading of those non-
convention size ships between the Caribbean Islands and the United.  In most of 
these processes, IMO has been actively involved and plays a key role in the success 
of these developments. 
 
3.11 Procedures for PSC 
In the early 1970, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) recognized the seriousness of substandard ship problem, which had been 
mainly caused by the transfer of ships to the flag of convenience registries, and 
referred the question of sub-standard ships to IMO.  Considering this matter, the 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) recognized that IMO is concerned with the 
elimination of sub-standard ships whatever flags they fly, and agreed that detailed 
procedures for PSC should be adopted. (Sasamura, 1997)  The first PSC procedure 
was developed by the MSC and adopted by the Assembly in 1973 in Resolution 
A.321 (IX).  After that, several PSC procedures under the SOLAS, Load Line and 
MARPOL Convention were adopted in Resolutions A.466 (XII), A.542(13) and 
MEPC.26(23).  The PSC was further extended to cover operational requirements 
under Resolution A. 742(18).  In 1995, these PSC procedures were amalgamated into 
a single document named “Procedures for Port State control” in Resolution A. 
787(19) adopted by the Assembly, which was again amended by Resolution A. 
882(21) to cover also the ISM requirements (See Appendix H for detail).   
These Procedures aims at providing basic guidance on how PSC inspections 
should be conducted and how to identify deficiencies in a ship, its equipment, or its 
crew, with the purpose of ensuring that convention control provisions are 
consistently applied across the world from port to port.  The Procedures are not 
legally binding and only offer guidance to port States, although they have been 
developed and agreed internationally.  While port States are expected to use the 
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Procedures when exercising PSC, they have been interpreted and applied in different 
ways in practice.  For example, if the convention control provisions were strictly 
interpreted, a routine or general inspection should be limited to an inspection on the 
validity of the ship's certificates, except in cases where clear grounds were found, 
which deserve a more detailed inspection.  However, people often argued that the 
presence of certificates is only evidence of, and not conformation of convention 
standards being met.  For this reason, some PSCOs may choose to inspect more than 
just the ship’s certificates while undertaking routine PSC inspections. 
(INTERCARGO, 2000)  
The detailed procedures for PSC (1999) are described in the IMO Resolution A. 
787(19) as amended by Resolution. A.882(21), which are mostly consolidated in all 
the regional PSC agreements.  Generally, they can be summarized as follows: 
Selection of ship to be inspected; Initial inspection; Detailed inspection; Detention; 
Reporting; Follow-up action.  These procedures should be observed in all the States 
carrying out PSC in order to achieve consistency all over the world.  The detailed 
provisions regarding the procedure of port State control can be found in the 
Appendix H: Procedures for port State control. 
 
3.12 Implementation of international conventions  
International conventions are legally binding for member States who have 
ratified or acceded the conventions.  They have an obligation to give effect to such 
conventions through national legislation.  Obviously, with reference to a certain 
convention, the PSC is only possible if the port State itself is a party to it and has 
fully implemented the convention in question. 
The international legislation regime regarding PSC seems to have provided 
adequate equipment for port States to make sure the foreign ships calling their ports 
are in compliance with the international conventions.  However, it is still up to the 
individual State parties to adopt domestic legislation in consistency with the 
international conventions so that all those fancy requirements in the conventions can 
be effectively enforced. 
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Many States have promulgated domestic legislation to give effect to the notion 
of PSC.  It should be noted that for State parties to the various conventions 
mentioned above, implementing the requirements of the conventions is not an option, 
but an obligation in international law.  
It is recognized that Parties may entrust surveys and inspections of ships entitled 
to fly their own flag either to surveyors nominated for this purpose or to recognized 
organizations, such as classification societies.  However, according to applicable 
conventions, PSC inspections of foreign ships, including boarding, inspection, 
remedial action and possible detention, can only be conducted by officers duly 
authorized by the port State.  The authorization of these PSCOs can be either a 
general grant of authority or may be specific on a case-by-case basis. (Hoppe, 2000 ) 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
It is clear that the international legislation has provided adequate legal 
instruments for port States to conduct PSC.  However, PSC can be conducted only 
when the port State has accepted the relevant international instruments and enforced 
them through national legislations. 
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Chapter 4    
Comparison of regional PSC MOUs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the inception of Paris MOU in the early 1980s and the adoption of IMO 
resolution A.682(17) called “Regional Cooperation in the Control of Ships and 
Discharges” in 1991, the world PSC regime has been progressing steadily and has 
almost achieved a global coverage.  This has been achieved largely through 
coordination by IMO and the dedicated commitments of responsible maritime 
authorities implementing PSC activities.  PSC is now widely accepted as a major 
driving force in maritime safety and marine environment protection, and an effective 
method for eradicating substandard ships running around the world (AMSA, 2000). 
 
4.2 Rationale for growth in PSC regional agreements 
While national PSC alone will strengthen the safety of ships and the marine 
environmental pollution prevention, working on a regional basis will achieve a better 
result in excluding substandard ships from operating in the region.  Without a 
regional approach, operators will just divert their ships to ports in a region where no 
or less strict PSC inspections are conducted, which will result in unfair competition 
vulnerability for ports of those countries that do conduct proper inspection (Hoppe, 
2000).  The Caribbean in the 1980’s was a good example of this (Rial, 1999).  To 
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avoid this problem and to improve the effectiveness of inspections, many maritime 
authorities of the world have already entered or are about to enter into regional PSC 
agreements.  Some countries even joined more than one MOU (e.g. Canada, Cuba, 
Australia) for various reasons, for example geography, language, culture, trading 
patterns. 
According to Hoppe (2000), there are basically three benefits in reaching a 
regional agreement.  The first is the exchange of information about ships, their 
records and the result of inspections carried out.  This information is important as it 
enables subsequent ports of call to concentrate their limited resources on ships that 
have not been recently inspected, while ensuring ships of prudent shipowners will 
not be interfered by unnecessary multiple inspections.  As a general principle, ships 
inspected within the last six months should not be re-inspected unless there are clear 
grounds to do so.  The second benefit is that identified sub-standard ships are 
effectively monitored.  This is important especially for ships allowed to sail with 
certain minor deficiencies on the condition that these are rectified in the next port of 
call, which may be successful only if effective information exchange is available 
between relevant ports.  The third and also the most important benefit is ensuring that 
PSC inspections are conducted in a uniform and harmonized manner, especially with 
regard to applicable standards in the detention of ships and the training standards of 
PSCOs.  Some MOUs has been successful in achieving this by conducting joint 
seminars for PSCOs in order to harmonize the procedures (Paris MOU Annul Report 
2000). 
Having been driven out from a region or regions having an effective PSC 
regime, some unscrupulous operators will try to find other areas where their 
substandard ships can operate without being effectively inspected.  Therefore, 
regional PSC MOUs should cover the entire world as far as possible, so that such 
grey areas will not exist.   Fortunately, so far eight regional PSC agreements have 
been signed and cover most of the coastal States of the world, which makes it 
extremely difficult for those unscrupulous shipowners to find a place to operate their 
sub-standard ships without being inspected.   
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4.3 Existing regional agreements on PSC 
Eight regional PSC agreements have been signed around the world to date.  The 
distribution of these regions can be seen in Appendix A.  A general description of 
these MOUs is given in Appendix D Table 3.  USCG is not really a regional MOU 
but may also be seen as, in essence, a regional MOU.  The Persian Gulf region 
agreement is still under development. 
Except the Paris MOU, most of the regions’ Maritime Administrations 
development levels are significantly different.  There is no doubt that it is impossible 
to launch a PSC program without the necessary structures and expertise in place.  
However, though desirable, it does not mean each and every coastal State in a region 
has to have a fully developed maritime administration before a regional PSC 
program can start, as long as there is a “critical mass” of appropriately developed 
Administrations, strategically located geographically and lying within the main 
trading routes of the vessels to be inspected.  For some regions, it may be desirable to 
pool the regional resources, with the more developed Administrations assisting and 
supporting the less developed ones for the purpose of bringing all the 
Administrations of the region to the required level within a reasonable time frame 
(Rial, 1999).  
 
4.4 Paris MOU 
4.4.1 General profiles of Paris MOU 
The first and perhaps most prominent regional PSC MOU ever developed is the 
Paris MOU signed in 1982 by 14 European countries.  The ancestor of the Paris 
MOU is the Hague Memorandum signed by a number of maritime authorities in 
Western Europe, which was initially developed to enforce the shipboard living and 
working condition requirement stipulated in ILO147.  However, a massive oil spill 
resulting from the grounding of the supertanker “Amoco Cadiz” off the coast of 
Brittany (France) in March 1978 incurred a strong political and public outcry in 
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Europe for far more stringent regulations with regard to the safety of shipping.  The 
pressure finally resulted in the adoption of a more comprehensive Paris MOU 
covering safety of life at sea, prevention of pollution by ships and living and working 
conditions on board ships (Kumpumaki, 2001).  The Paris MOU laid down for the 
first time the groundwork for effective international co-operation in PSC regime. 
Since then, the Paris MOU has been amended several times to accommodate 
new safety and marine environment requirements stemming from the IMO as well as 
other important developments such as the various EU Directives addressing marine 
safety and environmental protection.  The PSC in EU has now become a legal 
obligation, as EU Directive 95/21/EC now places a legal requirement on all EU 
member States to carry out PSC inspections. 
The number of member States has also increased to 19 mainly due to the 
increase in the number of member States of the European Union (EU).  Canada to the 
west and the Russian Federation to the east also participate as members of the Paris 
MOU (INTERCARGO, 2000).  It now covers the European coastal States and the 
coastal States of the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe. 
 
4.4.2 Paris MOU structure 
The executive body of the Paris MOU is the PSC Committee, which is 
composed of the representatives of the nineteen participating maritime authorities 
and the European Commission.  The PSC Committee normally meets once a year 
with representatives of IMO, ILO, USCG, and with other regional PSC MOUs such 
as the Tokyo MOU and the Caribbean MOU as observers.  The main role of the 
Committee is to deal with matters of policy, finance and administration with the 
assistance of technical bodies established within the organization. A diagram 
describing the Paris MOU organization can be found in Appendix E. 
 
4.4.3 Regional information center 
An advanced central computer database called Systeme d’Information Relatif 
aux Navires Controlles (SIReNaC) was established in Saint Malo, France.  Details of 
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each inspection report will be entered in this system whether or not deficiencies are 
found.  This database is accessible by all the PSCOs in the ports of the Paris MOU 
region to consult inspection files, to insert new inspection reports or to use the 
electronic mail facility.   A detention list is published monthly on the Paris MOU 
website, which contains ship’s name, the owner, the classification society and the 
place and date of detention.  This website also publishes a list of banned ships who 
run detention or fail to sail to the agreed repair port.   
 
4.4.4 Rationale of Paris MOU 
Recognizing the prime obligations of the owner and flag state, the Paris MOU 
(PMOU, 2000) realized that “effective action by port states is required to prevent the 
operation of sub-standard ships".   This goal may be better achieved through an 
improved and harmonized system of PSC and through strengthening co-operation 
and exchanging information, while at the same time avoiding distorting competition 
between ports. 
The PSC work in the Paris MOU region has been organized quite reasonably and 
consistently.  According to the agreement, each contracting state is required to 
establish an effective system of PSC to make sure that foreign merchant ships calling 
in its ports comply with the international instruments listed in the MOU.  They are 
also required to inspect a minimum of 25% of all foreign ships entering its ports in a 
year, which will in practice result in an inspection rate of approximately 90% of all 
foreign ships using the ports of the region (Hoopen, 1998).  Each authority (PMOU, 
2000) will “consult, co-operate and exchange information' with other authorities” 
and “seek to avoid inspecting ships that have been inspected by any of the other 
authorities within the previous six months unless they have clear grounds for 
inspection."   Ships having been inspected in any participating port within the last six 
months will not be reinspected.  No more favorable treatment will be given to ships 
flying the flag of a state not party to the memorandum.   
One of the most important and effective provisions of the Paris MOU is the 
obligation imposed upon each authority to publish quarterly information about 
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detentions under the PSC procedures. This information is required not only to 
contain the name of the ship, but also the name of her owner and operator, her flag 
state and her classification society.  The reasons for the detention are provided as 
well.  The latest innovation introduced was the publication of “Rust Bucket of the 
Month”, which gives people an idea on how bad condition a ship can be operated 
despite the great effort of the world PSC regime. 
It is interesting to notice that the PSC has been made mandatory under the EU 
legislation despite the fact that the Paris MOU itself is not a legally binding 
agreement.  This has been done through the EU Directive 95/21/EC to achieve 
harmonization, which has been implemented in the national legislations of the EU 
Members.  Consequently, the Paris MOU has been adjusted accordingly to meet the 
requirements of the Directive and to incorporate the relevant parts of the IMO 
Resolution 787 “Procedures for Port State Control”(Hoopen, 1998).   
As most of the member States have well developed Administrations with 
relatively better funds and resources, the Paris MOU has been running quite well.  
Seminars within the Paris MOU have been organized regularly to discuss some 
specific problems and update information.  A program of advanced training of 
PSCOs sponsored by the European Commission has been established in order to 
keep abreast of the technological change in the maritime area and of corresponding 
regulatory developments (Paris MOU Annual Report 2000).  The PSC inspections 
have been conducted in the Paris MOU in a harmonized and consistent way during 
the last several years, thanks to the great effort of the Paris MOU in training and 
coordinating the PSCOs of different countries.   
 
4.4.5 Targeting system 
Somewhat idealistically, the Paris MOU initially stated that there would be no 
discrimination against either owners or flags, which is in conformity with the 
Convention on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships.  However, realizing the 
stark reality that some ships pose more problems than others, an amendment was 
signed requiring port states to target certain kinds of ships and ships or their owners 
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with a known poor history in July 1993, which is now quite popularly accepted by 
most regional MOUs as a normal practice.  Certain flags were also targeted for 
special attention by means of a 3 year "rolling average" table of above average 
delays and detentions in the MOU's annual report. (Hare, 1995)  
An enhanced targeting system was launched in 2000 in order to achieve a more 
selective targeting against potentially high-risk ships while at the same time ease the 
burden on bonafide shipping.  Ships are now selected for inspection according to the 
targeting factor of the ship.  The detailed targeting factor may refer to “Paris MOU 
targeting factor” in Appendix F.  Statistics shows that this initiative has resulted in 
more inspections of high priority ships, in particular of ships registered with flag 
States considered as very high risk, and in a greater number of detentions. (Paris 
MOU Annual Report 2000)  
 
4.5 Tokyo MOU  
4.5.1 General profile of the Tokyo MOU 
Following the lead of the Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU for the Asian-Pacific 
Region was established in 1993.  So far, the Memorandum has been accepted by 17 
full member States of the Asia-Pacific region, which now covers much of the Far 
East and the Pacific and is in the pipeline for the Indian Ocean basins and for the 
South Atlantic.  The Tokyo MOU is up-and-running even though many of the 
participating states have yet to establish effective PSC facilities and procedures. 
(Hare, 1997) 
The structure of the Tokyo MOU is relatively simple in comparison to the Paris 
MOU.  It is governed by a PSC committee with a secretariat in charge of its routine 
work.  For the purpose of attaining more effective operation of the MOU and 
resolving important issues raised during intersessional periods, the Committee 
decided to establish the MOU Standing Working Group (SWG) to facilitate the work 
of the Committee. The SWG carries out its functions through Internet forum 
correspondence.  
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4.5.2 Rationale of Tokyo MOU 
The Tokyo MOU closely follows the Paris MOU in general except that the target 
regional inspection rate is 50% of the foreign ships entering the Asia-Pacific region. 
(Sasamura, 1997)  This goal was achieved in 1996.  The PSC Committee considered 
and adopted a new set of amendments to the Memorandum, including the adjustment 
to the regional inspection percentage from 50% to 75% and a new annex of 
qualitative criteria for members in February 2000.  The effective date of the 
amendments was 1 November 2000. 
Recognizing the fact that many maritime authorities in the Asia-Pacific region 
are still in the early stage of development of PSC activities, the PSC Committee paid 
special attention towards the education and training of PSCOs, and approved the 
integrated strategic plan for training PSCOs in order to harmonize the PSC activities 
in the Asia-Pacific region. (Sasamura, 1997)  This plan consisted of PSCO training 
program, PSCO exchange program and seminar for PSCOs.  According to Tokyo 
MOU Annual Report (2000), this program goes quite well.  A total of 216 PSCOs 
from 14 Authorities have received 3-week training course as well as some on-the-job 
training and technical visits.  Seminars for PSCOs have been organized regularly.  A 
new technical cooperation program, fellowship training, was initiated in 2000 in 
which two fellowship training courses were organized.  In addition, three expert 
mission training programs were organized during the same year.  Continuous 
progress has also been made in the PSCO exchange program.  Four further PSCO 
exchange missions among the Authorities of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong (China), 
Japan and New Zealand were implemented in 2000.  All these technical cooperation 
programs have greatly improved the PSCO’s professional ability especially those 
from developing PSC Authorities, while at the same time promoted the 
harmonization of PSC activities in the region.  
 
4.5.3 Regional database network 
A new computerized database system, the Asia-Pacific Computerized 
Information System (APCIS), which is located in Vladivostok, Russian, was 
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established in accordance with the Memorandum on 1 January 2000.  It is used for 
reporting and storing PSC inspection results and facilitating exchange of information 
in the region.  Most of the member authorities have been connected to the system.  
The project of providing data to the EQUASIS and exchanging information with the 
Paris MOU and the United States Coast Guard is also progressing smoothly.  
 
4.5.4 Targeting System 
A ship targeting system under the Tokyo MOU is still in the process of 
development. The Committee established an inter-sessional group, led by the 
Republic of Korea, to pursue this matter further.  The inter-sessional group would 
prepare proposals on development of the ship targeting system based on a study of 
the targeting systems used by the Paris MOU and the United States Coast Guard.  
 
 4.6 Viña del Mar MOU  
The Viña del Mar MOU was signed when the regional meeting took place in 
Viña del Mar, Chile, in early November 1992.  So far 12 member States have signed 
the MOU, most of which have a developing Maritime Administration and have a 
resource problem. (Rial, 2000)  Some training programs for PSCOs in the region 
have been organized with the help of the Canadian Administration to improve their 
professional ability.   
   The executive body of the MOU is the PSC Committee.  The Maritime 
Authorities of this Agreement pursue the objectives of the Operative Network of 
Regional Maritime Co-operation among Maritime Authorities (ROCRAM) strategy 
adopted in 1989 for the protection of the marine environment, and for adoption of an 
effective ship control system and development of a coordinated system of 
inspections. 
  This MOU follows the Paris MOU very closely but has adapted to the specific 
circumstances of the Latin American region.  It recognizes the objectives of a further 
regional maritime co-operation scheme and then again repeats the provisions of the 
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Paris MOU to a large extent.  However, the Viña del Mar MOU put some additions 
in Annex IV and Appendix I, which seek to establish a 'Trade data interchange 
director' and a computer system to include the data base records of the participating 
states. (Hare, 1997) The problem of incorporating the ILO 147 Convention in the 
agreement as a relevant instrument is still on the agenda.   This is mainly due to the 
fact that many of the member States are not yet the party to ILO 147. 
The Secretariat and the Information Center was established in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  Daily PSC inspection results of the Member State Authorities are 
submitted to the Information Center of the Latin American Agreement (CIALA).  
The database is used by the Maritime Authorities of the region for permanent 
consultation and information purposes to co-ordinate and plan their supervisory 
activities. (Latin American Agreement Secretariat, 2000) 
The MOU agreement requires each Maritime Authority to conduct a minimum 
of 15% of inspections of the total foreign ships entering their ports in a period of 12 
months.  There is also a very simple targeting system, the details of which can be 
found in Table 3 in Appendix D.   
 
4.7 Caribbean MOU  
The Caribbean MOU was concluded by the maritime authorities of twenty 
Caribbean States and territories in Barbados on 9 February 1996 in terms practically 
identical to the Paris MOU.  There is a mixed level of development of the Maritime 
Administrations within the region, from fully developed to little developed.  The 
funding of the secretariat is currently fairly well organized on an equal cost sharing 
among the full members, though some individual members/observers lack both fiscal 
and technical resources. (Rial, 2000)  The Caribbean MOU has been working quite 
closely with the USCG.   
The main purpose of the Caribbean MOU is to enhance the safety of small ships, 
which form the main part of the regional fleet, both from flag and port States points 
of view.  To improve the performance of small ships operating in the region, the 
MOU successfully developed the Caribbean Cargo Ship Safety (CCSS) Code in 
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cooperation with the USCG.  The code was recognized by the USCG as an 
alternative to US requirements for such ships in the absence of the Convention 
requirements. (Rial, 1999)  This code is intended to cover all aspects of commercial 
cargo ships of under 500 gross tonnage operating regionally.   
The regional Secretariat is provided by Barbados and a regional information 
centre is set up in Curacao. 
The Member States are expected to inspect 15% of visiting ships within 3 years 
after joining the MOU.  The details of the targeting system can be found Table 3 in 
Appendix D.   
 
4.8 Mediterranean MOU  
The Mediterranean MOU on PSC was concluded on 11 July 1997 in Valletta, 
Malta, which basically follows the Paris MOU pattern.  So far 11 Maritime 
Authorities have signed the MOU.  The Mediterranean MOU and most of its member 
Maritime Authorities are still in the early developing stage.  Expertise and resources 
are highly needed.   
The executive body of the MOU is the PSC Committee, which is composed of 
the representatives of the participating maritime authorities and the European 
Commission. The Committee meets once year, or at shorter intervals if necessary.  
Representatives of IMO, ILO and the European Commission, as well as 
representatives of several cooperating maritime authorities and other regional MOU, 
participate as observers in the meetings of the Committee.  The Committee deals 
with matters of policy, finance and administration and is assisted by technical bodies 
established within the organization.   
PSCO training seminars have been organized to ensure that effective and 
harmonized inspection procedures are followed throughout the regions. These 
seminars keep PSCOs informed of new technical developments and amendments to 
the MOU.   
The information center is located in Casablanca, Morocco.  All details from each 
inspection report are entered in the database whether deficiencies are found or not. 
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This database can be accessed by all PSCOs in the ports of the region to consult 
inspection files, to insert new inspection reports or to use the electronic mail facility. 
The Member States are expected to reach a 15% annual inspection rate of 
visiting ships within 3 years of joining the MOU.  The details of the targeting system 
can be found in Table 3 in Appendix D.   
 
4.9 Indian Ocean MOU  
The Indian Ocean PSC MOU (IOMOU) for the Indian Ocean Region was signed 
in Pretoria, South Africa on 5 June 1998.  So far, the MOU is composed of 18 
participating Maritime Authorities and associate members, however 10 of 18 are still 
pending acceptance. The Indian Ocean MOU stretching westwards from India to 
South Africa also includes Australia.   
 Even though most of the member States realized the need for strong PSC, many 
of them do not have strong Maritime Administrations.  The expertise and resources 
for conducting PSC are rather limited.  The Australia Authority also joined the 
MOU, which is good news for the MOU to improve the member States performance 
by learning the experience of Australia Authority.   Mutual cooperation and 
interaction between the IOMOU and the Tokyo MOU is progressing in the same 
manner as is being done between the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU.  This is a 
good start as it is extremely important for the IOMOU to have a harmonized PSC 
regime with other MOU right from the beginning.  The MOU is still in its infancy 
stage compared with the other relatively developed MOUs.   The weak financial 
situations of most of the member States also undermine their performance and their 
ability to fulfill their commitment in establishing an effective PSC regime. 
(Mehrotra, 2000) 
The executive body of the MOU is the PSC Committee, which is composed of 
the representatives of the participating maritime authorities.  An Inter-Sessional 
Management Group was established to represent the Committee during intersessional 
periods and it is charged with a range of responsibilities.   
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The Member States are expected to reach a 10% annual inspection rate of 
visiting ships within 3 years after joining the MOU.  The PSC Committee is expected 
to consider proposals for an Indian Ocean Computer Information System, based on 
the IT procedures of the Tokyo MOU. (IMO, 2000)  The details of the targeting 
system can be found in Table 3 in Appendix D.   
 
4.10 West & Central Africa MOU  
Sixteen West and Central African States signed the West & Central Africa MOU 
on 22 October 1999.  Angola, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea attended the meeting 
and agreed to sign at a later date.  The member States promised to make every effort 
to put in place competent maritime administrations where they do not already exist, 
and to strengthen existing maritime administrations in order to implement an 
effective PSC regime.  The MOU basically follows the Paris MOU.  It emphasized 
the urgent need for training of PSCOs in the region.  The South Africa Maritime 
Authority has very kindly provided some PSCO training programs for other member 
States, most of which do not have the expertise and resources to conduct an effective 
PSC inspection.   
The executive body of the MOU is the PSC Committee, which is composed of 
the representatives of the participating maritime authorities.  The Regional 
Secretariat for the MOU is located in Lagos, Nigeria, while a regional Information 
Center has been established in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire.  This MOU also conducts PSC 
inspections on ships below 500GT, as these vessels tend to trade inter-regionally.   
The MOU requires that within three years of the MOU becoming effective, each 
signatory must establish an effective PSC system inspecting at least 15 per cent of 
foreign merchant ships entering the region's ports.  The details of the targeting 
system can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix D.   As the information concerning 
the performance of the MOU is quite limited, it is very difficult to make further 
comment on this MOU.   
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4.11 Black Sea MOU 
Six Maritime Authorities in the Black Sea region signed the Black Sea MOU in 
April 2000.  The IMO and the ILO are associated with the Black Sea MOU as 
observers.  The objective of the Black Sea MOU is to ensure effective action by the 
port states concerned to prevent the operation of substandard ships while 
harmonizing inspection, strengthening co-operation and the exchange of information.  
The MOU was established following the model of other MOUs with the active 
involvement of IMO.  Recognizing the need for an efficient system of inspections, 
the Black Sea MOU allows for an interim period of two years prior to its full 
functioning and implementation. (Hardin, 2000) 
An Interim Secretariat was established in Istanbul by the Turkish Maritime 
Administration in accordance with the decision of the signatory meeting of the 
MOU.  An Interim Information Center of the Black Sea Information System (BSIS) 
for the MOU will be provided by the Russian Federation with the same system as 
being used in the Tokyo MOU, and located in Novorossiysk.  The functional 
requirements for the Information Center have not yet been decided.   
The Member States are expected to reach a 15% annual inspection rate of 
visiting ships within 3 years after joining the MOU.  The details of the targeting 
system can be found table 3 in Appendix D. 
 
4.12 Persian Gulf region 
The first draft of the PSC agreement for the Regional Organization for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) sea Area and the complementary 
training programs for its implementation was discussed in July 1999 in Manama, 
Bahrain, at a meeting organized by the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center 
(MEMAC) Bahrain, in cooperation with the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and 
IMO.  Delegates from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates attended the meeting, with UNEP/ROWA (Regional Office for West 
Africa) as observers. (IMO, 2000) 
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A second meeting (venue and date not yet fixed) is expected to see the signature 
of MOU on PSC and also to decide on the location of the secretariat and information 
center. 
 
4.13 USCG 
Even though most of the world’s developed maritime authorities have joined in 
one or two regional PSC MOUs, the United States has, however, chosen to remain 
outside of any regional MOU grouping.  Under the US PSC program, it undertakes 
control measures on a unilateral basis.   
The United States formally started its PSC inspection on 1st May 1994 by the 
USCG, which prior to 1994, concerned itself mainly with limited aspects of 
navigation safety and pollution prevention, particularly in relation to tanker and 
passenger vessels.  It was unusual for the USCG to intervene to enforce the 
compendium of international instruments embraced by PSC. 
The objective of the USCG PSC program is to eradicate the presence of 
substandard ships in US waters, and to this extent it parallels to that of the American 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA).  All vessels of 1600 GRT or more are required to give 
advanced notice of their arrival.  The USCG then checks the vessel's details against 
its own records and that of its register and assigns points to each ship for compliance 
with international conventions, previous track records and those of sister ships in the 
same ownership or management, and the rating of the flag and classification society 
involved.   Through this way the USCG may identify high-risk vessels, their owners 
and their classification societies and can then take appropriate action.  Flags, owners 
& operators and classification societies are assessed to help assigning the priority 
rating to a vessel under inspection upon the declared policy.  If any of these entities 
fails to fully undertake its responsibilities for the safe operation of a ship, then the 
ship is likely to be considered a sub-standard vessel by the USCG.  A percentage 
rating is then given to both flags and classification societies. 
According to the point rating system, ships are categorized as Priority I, II or III. 
Priority I includes the high-risk vessels, which require inspection before they are 
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even allowed into port limits, often at the buoys.  Defects must be rectified before the 
vessel enters the port if it is possible.  Other ships will be inspected following the 
priority rating assigned to them.  A detailed Boarding Priority Matrix is given in 
Table 2 in Appendix C. 
One of the USCG PSC’s most important policies is the publication of lists of 
owners and operators, flag states and classification societies, which have fallen foul 
of USCG PSC procedures during the past twelve months.  The USCG diligently 
publishes monthly detention records, giving full details of the vessel and the defects 
both on its website and in Lloyds List.  
The USCG launched the Qualship 21 (Quality Shipping for the 21st Century) on 
January 1, 2001 (See Appendix G for detail), which is an initiative to identify high 
quality non-U.S. flagged vessels, and then reward them with incentives.  Quality 
ships are such vessels that are managed by well-run companies, classed by 
organizations with a quality track record, having an outstanding PSC record in U.S. 
waters, and are registered with Flag States that have a superior PSC record.   So far 
around 800 ships were found eligible for the program, and 379 of them were awarded 
Qualship 21 status in March 2001, the first month that incentives began.  Incentives 
for Qualship 21 vessels include Qualship 21 Certificates, vessel names posted on the 
Coast Guard PSC web site, Qualship designation on EQUASIS files, and less 
frequent PSC examinations (USCG annual report 2000).  This new USCG initiative 
supplements the old PSC regime, which has mainly used a penalizing policy, with 
some incentives to the prudent shipowners.  Hopefully, this program will accelerate 
the progress of eliminating substandard ships and create a favorable atmosphere for 
the quality shipowners in this world.  It is too early to predict how successful the 
program will be at this moment.  However, this could be the right direction for the 
international maritime regime to achieve its goal of quality shipping.  In the author’s 
opinion, the IMO should give more attention on this program and may recommend 
this program to be applied in other region if it turns out to be a successful program.  
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4.14 Conclusion 
The existing eight regional PSC MOUs and USCG have constituted a global 
PSC regime, in which the Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU and USCG have developed 
into a relatively grown-up stage.  The other six MOUs are still in a relatively 
undeveloped stage.  Most of the maritime authorities in these MOUs lack the 
necessary resources and expertise to conduct proper PSC inspections.  Great effort 
still needs to be taken by these MOUs and IMO to upgrade the PSC quality in these 
MOUs so that the global PSC regime may be more harmonized and consistent.  
It has been generally acknowledge that PSC is a good alternative in eliminating 
substandard ships.  The rapid development of the regional PSC MOUs reflects this 
belief to some extent.  However, whether this belief is correct or not and how 
effective has it been?  These questions will be answered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5    
An assessment of the PSC regime 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the inception of PSC in the Paris MOU in 1982, the institution of PSC has 
attracted more and more attention as an effective mechanism for implementing 
various IMO and ILO standards in the areas of safety and marine environmental 
protection.  It has gradually become an accepted fact in today’s shipping world, 
which complements, and to some extent overshadows, the role of the flag state in the 
implementation of international maritime legislation.  In short, the PSC regime is 
becoming an indispensable component in the drive towards a goal of “safer ships and 
cleaner seas”. (Payoyo, 1994) 
So far, the Paris MOU has been conducting PSC inspections for around 20 years.   
Tokyo MOU and USCG have also worked diligently on the PSC regime for more 
than 7 years.  The recent development of other regional PSC MOUs has almost 
covered the whole world coastal area.  What has the PSC regime around the world 
achieved and how successful have they been in eradicating substandard ships?  This 
chapter tries to research the effectiveness of the PSC regime and some other 
problems in conducting PSC. 
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5.2 General profile of PSC inspections 
According to Paris MOU secretariat (Paris MOU, 2001), the quantity of PSC 
inspections is one indicator that can be relied upon in measuring the impact of PSC 
in the region.   
 
Number of inspections under Paris MOU 
 
Fig. 1.  (Source: Paris MOU annual report 2000) 
 
Number of inspections under Tokyo MOU 
8000 8834
12243 12957
14545 14931
16034
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of inspections
 
Fig. 2.  (Source: Tokyo MOU annual report 2000) 
Figures 1 and 2 show the number of inspections conducted by the Paris MOU 
and the Tokyo MOU respectively.  The statistics show that the number of inspections 
in the Tokyo MOU increased very fast during the early years of the MOU and 
became relatively stable in the last three years, which indicates that the Tokyo MOU 
has come close to a grown up stage.  The number of inspections conducted in the 
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Paris MOU has been quite stable since 1993, even though it shows a small trend of 
increasing magnitude in recent years.  This is quite understandable, as the Paris 
MOU was established in 1982 and most of its member states have a developed 
maritime Authority.   
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Fig. 3.  (Source: Paris MOU annual report 2000) 
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Fig. 4.  (Source: Tokyo MOU annual report 2000) 
Figures 3 and 4 give the deficiency rates in respect of ships inspected in the Paris 
MOU and the Tokyo MOU.  Most people believe that the overall performance of the 
shipping industry has been improved because of the increasingly rigorous PSC 
regime.  However, the deficiency number in respect of ships inspected was actually 
increasing in the early stages and has stabilized in recent years.  One reason people 
have argued is that measures to concentrate PSC efforts on potentially sub-standard 
ships by using a targeting system are being implemented in order to use resources 
 49
effectively and to benefit ships with a good safety record.  Thus most of the 
potentially risky ships are inspected while the good ships are left undisturbed. (Paris 
annual report 2000)   The outstanding increase of deficiency rates in the Paris MOU 
in the year 2000 because of the new enhanced target system launched in the same 
year is a good example of the effort of PSC and its effectiveness. 
 
Detention rates in respect of inspections under Paris MOU 
 
Fig. 5.  (Source: Paris MOU annual report 2000) 
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Detention rates in respect of individual ships under USCG 
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Fig. 7.  (Source: USCG annual report 2000) 
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Fig. 8.  (Source: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999) 
 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the detention rates in respect of ships inspected in the 
Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU and USCG.  It is interesting to notice that the detention 
rate trend do not follow the deficiency rate trend as indicated in Figure 8.  In fact, 
detention has been consistently decreasing after reaching a peak in year 1995, 1998 
and 1997 in the three regions respectively except the Paris MOU in 2000 when the 
Paris MOU launched the new enhanced targeting system.  This trend has been most 
remarkably demonstrated in the US, which is supposed to have one of the strictest 
PSC regimes.  Considering the increasingly rigorous and reasonable targeting 
system, this trend provides further evidence that the quality of vessels visiting this 
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area is improving. (USCG annual report 2000)  This also indicates to some extent 
that the PSC inspections in these regions have been working effectively. 
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Fig. 10.  (Source: World Casualty Statistics 1999) 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show the overall summary of total losses of ships since 1994.  
From the statistics it is clear that the number of ships and the total gross tonnage lost 
during the period 1994 to 1999 have decreased, which follows the trend of the ships 
detained in the same period.  This is also a piece of evidence of the success of the 
world PSC regime.  The slight increase of detention rates in 2000 in the Paris MOU 
is mainly due to the more stringent and focused targeting system adopted in this year. 
(Paris MOU annual report 2000)  Despite the fact that the ship rates found to have 
deficiencies under the Paris MOU increased steadily as shown in Figure 8, the 
deficiency ratios for inspections in which deficiencies were found (see Figure 11) has 
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decreased.  The only exception is observed in year 2000 (with the same reason 
explained above), which is an increase for the first time during the last five years.    
Obviously, only ships with deficiencies are responsible for the total number of 
deficiencies.  Thus, it can be concluded that the overall ship quality has improved. 
 
Deficiency ratios for inspections in which deficiencies were found  
Fig. 11.   (Paris MOU, 2001) 
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for which class is responsible.  Alan Cubbin (2001), chairman of the Paris MOU PSC 
Committee comments on the results of the campaign, saying:  
The number of oil tankers detained during the campaign highlights the fact 
that the rate of detention of tankers has increased since 1998 when the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code was introduced on these 
vessels.  The campaign also shows that poorly maintained oil tankers with 
structural defects and deficient fire fighting capacity continue to operate in 
the region.  This is clearly a cause for concern, especially since the sample 
may not be representative of vessels that regularly trade to the region, as the 
worst ships may have stayed away when the campaign was announced. 
On the whole, it can be concluded that the shipping quality in the Paris MOU, 
the Tokyo MOU and the US has improved during the past several years, which leads 
to the conclusion that the world PSC regime has achieved partial success.  However, 
despite the diligent efforts of the PSC regime, a large number of substandard ships 
still running around the world leave no room for complacency. (Paris MOU, 2001)  
Some ship owners and flag States still avoid their responsibility by operating or 
condoning substandard ships and continue to be caught in the PSC safety net. 
 
5.3 Concentrated Inspection Campaigns 
A very useful concept initiated by the Paris MOU is the Concentrated Inspection 
Campaigns (CIC), which is now more and more frequently being used in the Paris 
MOU, the Tokyo MOU and USCG in order to promote the implementation of 
international standards, especially those newly enforced.   Several CICs have been 
conducted in the Paris MOU and Tokyo region in recent years.  These campaigns 
mainly focus on a particular area of compliance with international regulations with 
the aim of gathering information on, and enforcing, the level of compliance.  Each 
campaign is prepared by experts and focuses on a number of specific items/areas for 
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inspection.  Specific guidelines have been developed to assist the PSCOs in these 
inspections.  Experience shows that they serve to draw attention to the chosen area of 
compliance and promote the enforcement of some new regulations in an effective 
manner. (Paris MOU annual report 2000)  For example, before the entry into force of 
the ISM Code on 1 July 1998, many people predicted that a substantial number of 
ships would not be able to meet the deadline for compliance.  However, the 
prediction of wide scale non-compliance did not materialize. (Paris MOU annual 
report 1998)   One of the main reasons for such a relatively high proportion of 
enforcement is because of the strong message of enforcement of the ISM 
requirements, which was sent by the Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU and USCG, who 
jointly agreed to mount a CIC of the ISM compliance.  Ships not complying with the 
ISM requirements would surely be detained or refused entry into ports of these 
regions.   
The CIC as a way of promoting compliance and enforcement in certain areas, 
which usually appears to attract the public attention, has been more and more 
frequently used.  Apart from the CIC mentioned above, a CIC against bulk carriers 
over 30, 000GT and older than 15 years was launched between 1 April and 30 June 
1999 with special attention to the structural problems for these ships, which have 
been one of the main reasons for the failure of these kinds of ships.  The Paris MOU 
also started on 1 March 2001, a three-month CIC on securing arrangements for all 
ships in the Paris MOU region carrying freight units on deck to inspect for 
compliance with the international regulations.  This is initiated in recognizing the 
fact that proper securing of cargo is often neglected by ship owner, as indicated by 
several incidents of cargo loss in recent years that may present a serious hazard for 
shipping and harm to the environment.   
All these CICs have attracted special attention from the shipping industry and 
have obviously improved the compliance of regulations to some extent.  According 
to Rose (2001), several benefits obtained from CICs have been observed.  Firstly, 
they raise the awareness for all PSCOs to particular areas/items of concern, which 
should generally be taken into account during all PSC inspections.  Secondly, they 
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increase the uniformity of inspections and consistency of actions between PSCOs 
within the same region.  Thirdly, they enable new requirements or items of particular 
concern to be addressed in a timely manner. 
 However, the CICs have mostly been conducted in the Paris MOU, usually 
within a three-month period, which may limit their effectiveness, as some imprudent 
ship owners may evade inspection by avoiding operation of their ships in this area 
for just that period.  Therefore, it is more preferable for all the existing PSC MOUs 
to coordinate their actions by adopting a coincident CIC program so that those 
substandard ships will find nowhere to hide, which will surely multiply the 
effectiveness of the PSC regime. 
 
5.4 Detention rate by ship types 
Figure 12 shows the detention rate by ship type under the Paris MOU for 1999 
and Tokyo MOU for 2000.  The figures under the Paris and the Tokyo MOUs show 
similar trends, which means the statistics in these two regions reflect the global 
situation to some extent.  
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Fig. 12.  (Source: Paris MOU annual report 2000, Tokyo MOU annual report 2000) 
 The fact that different types of ships have significantly different detention rates 
indicates that some type of ships do have a higher potential risk than other kind of 
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ships.  Therefore it is justifiable to include the ship type as a factor in the regional 
MOU targeting systems.  On the other hand, it is important for Maritime 
Administrations and PSCOs to know that different types of ships have different areas 
necessitating attention in their management and inspections.  Mounting CICs against 
some types of relatively high risk ships as done in the Paris MOU is a good 
alternative in eliminating substandard ships with limited resources, which can be 
recommended for use in other regional MOUs where resource are relatively limited. 
 
5.5 Detention by flags 
Figure 13 shows flag States with high detention percentages for the three-year 
rolling average for the period 1998-2000 in the Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU and 
USCG.  The data given here in this figure only include those countries with at least 
60 PSC inspections during the relevant three years and with relatively higher 
detention rates in all the three regions.  Countries such as Albania and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are not listed here as these countries have 
very high detention rates within one region but very few in other regions because of 
the unique trade patterns of ships flying these flags.   
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This figure shows that some countries have detention rates significantly higher 
than the average detention rates of at least one region, or in the entire three regions, 
such as Honduras, Belize and Cambodia in the last three years.  If tracing back the 
inspection data concerning these countries, it can be found that these countries have 
bad records almost all the time.  This is a clear indication that some maritime 
administrations, which are more and more frequently called substandard maritime 
administrations by some people, really do not have the ability or willingness to keep 
the ships flying their flags in a standard of compliance with international 
conventions.  
According to international law principles, ships should be inspected without 
discrimination to their flag.  However, as some countries obviously do not fulfil their 
flag State responsibility properly, and many shipowners actually choose to register 
their ships in these substandard administrations intentionally in order to avoid strict 
flag State control of their own countries, why should the international PSC regime 
treat these flags equally as if nothing has happened?  In fact, in the author’s opinion 
it would prejudice the interests of those prudent flag States especially ships flying 
their flags by putting these shipowners in a vulnerable competition situation. 
  According to an OECD report (1996), the shipowners operating their ships in a 
substandard manner would save themselves approximately 15% of their cost (OECD, 
1996), which is a difference big enough to decide the success or failure of a 
shipowner in such a fierce competitive shipping market.  It is therefore completely 
justified for some targeting systems to give more emphasis on the flag State factor 
such as in the Paris MOU and USCG.  It also justified the IMO’s effort in promoting 
flag States implementation (FSI), even though so far it still does not seem to be very 
successful.  One main hindrance of promoting FSI is that IMO does not have “teeth” 
to challenge the old principle of sovereignty.  However, more and more people have 
acknowledged that PSC may work as “teeth” of the international maritime regime to 
force those substandard Maritime Administrations to live up to a quality standard. 
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5.6 Case study 
It is clear that flag States holds the prime responsibility of ensuring the 
compliance with international standards.  The PSC regime is only a supplement to 
the flag States control as the last defence for eliminating substandard ships.  It is 
impossible to eliminate substandard ships without the commitment of the flag States. 
  The experience of the Chinese shipping industry proved this theory.  The 
detention rates of Chinese flag ships were pretty high in the Paris MOU region 
before 1997.  Actually the detention rates had been consistently rising despite the 
stricter PSC inspection and action taken in the Paris MOU.  This situation was 
unchanged until 1997 when the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration (CMSA) 
realized that the Chinese government should fulfil its obligation imposed by 
international conventions to keep its fleet in compliance with international standards.  
In addition, the CMSA realized that doing this was not only for the safety of ships 
and marine environmental protection but also for the sake of the Chinese government 
as a responsible government in the world community.  Since then the CMSA has 
taken a series of measures in raising the standards of the Chinese fleet and the results 
shown in Figure 14 is clear.  The situations in the Tokyo MOU and USCG are very 
similar to that of the Paris MOU.   
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Fig. 14.   (Source: Paris MOU annual report) 
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From this case, it should be recognized that adopting a strict PSC regime is just 
not enough.  Some kind of incentives for flag States to strengthen their own control 
are extremely important and of course more effective.  The role of the flag States in 
keeping their fleet quality up to standards should never be neglected. 
 
5.7 Effectiveness of PSC 
It is obvious that PSC can be effective in eliminating substandard ships only 
when it is exercised properly by qualified PSCOs (Sasamura, 2000).  However, it 
should be recognized that PSC alone couldn’t eliminate substandard ships.  PSC is 
exercised during the short period when a ship stays in port and normally at the same 
time as loading, unloading or other operations are being carried out.  Therefore, it is 
not appropriate to expect PSCOs to examine the conditions of the ship as thoroughly 
as the flag State surveyors can do.   
However, PSC has proved to be effective by those jurisdictions that are taking 
their PSC obligations seriously (and that are fortunate enough to have the means to 
do so) in narrowing the trading options of substandard ship: such as Australia, which 
was once a favoured destination for them, and the US.   This is true as Lloyds List 
editor pointed out (Hare, 1997):  
You would have to be mad or terminally ignorant to fix a marginal ship out of 
an Australian port, and if you have an oil cargo to ship to the US you would 
need quality tonnage operated by demonstrably high quality managers.  
 According to the Paris MOU annual report (2001), the flags of Mauritius, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which were on the black list for some time, do not appear 
on any list in 2000.  Apparently these registers have withdrawn most of their fleets 
from the region, quite possibly because their fleets have been the top priority in PSC 
inspection.  In fear of the rigorous inspection for ships of these flags, the shipowners 
of these ships have no choice but to withdraw their ships from this region.  However, 
it should be remembered that these ships did not disappear but just move to other 
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regions.   That is one reason why we have to emphasize the importance of the 
uniformity of PSC inspections.   
One thing that should not be forgetten is that the PSC was not designed to work 
as a tool for eliminating substandard ships, but as a supplement to the work of flag 
State control.  Its effectiveness should be assessed not on the basis of its ability in 
eliminating substandard ships but its ability in influencing the flag States to 
implement their obligations imposed by accepted international conventions.  In this 
respect, the PSC regime has been effective to some extent based on the analysis 
mentioned above. 
 
5.8 Limitation of PSC 
PSC inspection is limited by time scale and access available to ships and 
shipowners.  Usually the statutory surveys are announced and arrangements are made 
for access to equipment, the ship’s structure and construction records.  However, the 
short time in port of most vessels combined with problems of physical access to the 
structure of the vessel limits the extent of PSC inspections and also limits assessment 
of the human element. 
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Figure 15 shows the deficiency rate by main categories in relation to inspection.  
From this figure, it can be noticed that the highest numbers of the deficiencies 
identified by the PSC inspections relate to life-saving appliances and fire fighting 
appliances, as these deficiencies are usually easier to detect.   
No doubt the lifesaving and fire fighting appliances are essential for the safety of 
the ship and people on board.  The absence of or defects in these appliances would 
pose a threat to the ship, people on board or the marine environment.  However, 
unseaworthy conditions of ships carrying large quantities of hazardous and noxious 
substances would pose a much bigger threat to the port and coastal States.  The 
problem is that it is much more difficult to check the seaworthiness of ships, 
particularly the structural integrity of ships, as PSC inspections are mainly limited to 
visual external inspections of the ships. (Sasamura, 2000)   
The concern about ensuring the structural integrity of ships has been increasing, 
especially after recent casualties of oil tankers such as “Nakhodka” and “Erika”.  
Both of them were caused by insufficient structural integrity, which resulted in huge 
damages to the coastline of Japan and France.  The results of these accidents 
indicated that the structural integrity of ships deserve more attention not only from 
the flag State control but from the port State as well.   
However, people have agreed that the structural defects leading to the “Erika” 
accident could not have been detected by PSCOs. (Freudmann, 2000)  The limitation 
of PSC makes it impractical for the port States to thoroughly assess the longitudinal 
strength of all the ships.  The responsibility of ensuring the structural integrity of 
ships should still rely on the flag State control and it should be carried out during the 
enhanced programme of inspections under resolution A.744(18).  What the port 
States can do is to verify that the above-mentioned assessment has been carried out 
by the flag States and that ships with insufficient strength have undergone renewal or 
reinforcement work.  The availability of information on the assessment is important 
to the port States, as the port States may carry out their own assessment of the 
structural integrity of the ship if the relevant information is not available and the 
visual condition of the ship warrants a new assessment.   
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Most people will agree that around 80% of maritime casualties may be attributed 
to human errors.  PSC of operational requirements under the SOLAS and MARPOL 
conventions authorizes the PSCOs to verify that the master and crew are familiar 
with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of the ships and prevention 
of pollution.  Unlike the deficiencies in the ship and its equipment, which is visible 
and relatively easy to detect, inspection of operational requirements requires the 
PSCOs to have a very high knowledge and experience of ship’s equipment, operation 
as well as management.  Unfortunately, many of the PSCOs in developing maritime 
authorities and even in some developed maritime authorities still have great 
difficulties in acquiring adequate knowledge in these areas to conduct a proper 
operational inspection.  The compromised requirement on PSCOs qualification and 
training, which is included in the IMO resolution on PSC procedures, also 
compromised the overall ability of the international PSC regime in identifying 
deficient operations by crew and promoting their operational competence.   
The last limitation of PSC is that PSC action is basically post facto inspection, 
which means it is reactive to a situation that has already developed.  The only ones 
who can influence the situation are the owner and the flag State.  In addition, the 
PSC inspection is mainly a spot check, even though an increasingly targeted and 
informed checks have been adopted, and the reports of defects will be 
correspondingly limited to those that are readily observable.   
 
5.9 Targeting ships 
Even though inspecting more ships is always a goal of regional PSC MOUs, it 
would be more efficient and cost-effective if the potentially high-risk ships could be 
identified and inspected with priority.  All the existing regional PSC MOUs have 
included guidances for selecting ships to be inspected with priority.  The USCG has a 
complicated numerical targeting factor system (see Appendix C: USCG Boarding 
Priority Matrix) based on its own inspection records.  The Paris MOU also launched 
an enhanced targeting system in 2000 (see Appendix F: Paris MOU targeting factor), 
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which seems to have worked quite effectively from the inspection results analysed in 
this Chapter.  The Tokyo MOU is still in the process of establishing a similar system.   
The numerical values assigned to each element, including the type and age of 
ship, flag, classification society and previous detention, are to some extent 
determined in an arbitrary way. (Sasamura, 2000)  Nevertheless, the resulting 
targeting factor seems to have reflected the actual condition of ships to some degree 
and has worked quite well in selecting potentially risk ships to be inspected.  So far, 
the targeting systems are mainly based on individual databases.  It would be more 
reliable and comprehensive if a global database can be used, such as the EQUASIS 
system.   
One thing that should be pointed out is that the targeting factor only provides 
guidance for selecting ships.  The targeting factors of different regions do not have to 
be exactly the same.  Each region or each State may have its own priority list of ships 
to be inspected depending on their own unique trading patterns and prime concerns.  
For example, the EU countries may think it most important to keep the safety of ro-
ro passenger ships in order to protect the life of their citizens, while the countries in 
the Asian-Pacific region may take the oil tanker and bulk carrier as the highest 
priority because of the large amount of oil and bulk cargoes traded in this region.  
What is important is that the respective targeting system should be effective in 
identifying substandard ships operating in the region.  So far, most of the targeting 
systems established in other MOUs actually copied the model of the Paris MOU, 
which may not reflect the unique factor of their regional characteristics.  Considering 
the actual status of these MOUs, in which most of the Maritime Administrations lack 
adequate resources and expertise to conduct effective PSC inspection, it will be 
better if these MOUs could establish their own unique targeting system based on 
their own regional characteristics.   
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5.10 Fairness of PSC 
The fairness of PSC may be related to two major areas.  Firstly, there is the 
uniformity in the application of PSC inspection standards.  Secondly, there is in the 
interest of the State or the port to carry out PSC inspections (Tupper & Chick, 1999).   
The problem of uniformity in the application of PSC inspection standards mainly 
involves the standards applied by individual Maritime Authorities and the 
professional ability of PSCOs in applying these standards.  As most of the maritime 
authorities have joined in one or two PSC MOU, it is important for all the regional 
MOUs to adopt a harmonized and consistent inspection standard.  So far, most of the 
regional MOUs have adopted the same or similar standard to that of the Paris MOU.  
The problem of standard difference between individual regional MOUs is not very 
large anymore.  However, it is within individual MOUs where most of the standard 
differences exist because of the different conventions each State has accepted and the 
different capabilities in applying these standards.  The solution to this problem relies 
on the commitment of the governments of each State and the effort of IMO and the 
relevant regional MOUs.   
The quality of PSCOs has been one of the main concerns not only for the IMO 
but also for the shipping industry.  According to IMO Resolution A.787(19),  the 
final judgement on whether the ship is up to the standard  or is sub-standard rests 
upon the professional judgement of PSCOs.  Therefore, it is extremely important that 
the PSC is exercised by qualified and trained PSCOs.  Nevertheless, the professional 
ability of PSCOs in applying these standards may vary significantly, which is not 
desirable especially for the shipping industry.  Quality ship operators do not consider 
PSC inspections as harassments to their operation, but are concerned with the quality 
of PSCOs and their unjustifiable detentions.  Sometimes PSCOs detain ships for 
deficiencies such as: officers not wearing uniform; failure to amend the old ship 
name on one trading certificate; and refusal to escort the PSCO on his inspection, 
which is very difficult to justify as detainable deficiencies.  However, in most cases it 
is the ship owners who have to suffer from the unjustifiable detentions, even though 
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most of the conventions have a provision saying that the ship owners are entitled to 
compensation for any loss or damage suffered when a ship is unduly detained or 
delayed.  
The recent proliferation of regional MOUs is a good trend in globalising the PSC 
regime.  However, some of the States seem to have difficulty in fulfilling flag State 
obligations (Sasamura, 2000).  It is difficult to make people believe that these States 
can exercise proper PSC inspections.  To be responsible port States, these States 
should first exercise their flag State control properly and train their flag State control 
officers properly.  A qualified PSCO should be a qualified flag State control officer 
first.   
The problem of PSCO quality in different countries depends on the 
government’s commitment and the resources and expertise available to them.  This 
problem can be partly solved by education and training of PSCOs through the 
cooperation between countries in the same MOU.  The Tokyo MOU has worked very 
hard to improve the quality of PSCOs and to avoid unjustifiable detentions by 
organizing basic training courses and seminars for PSCOs.  PSCO seminars are 
organized each year to discuss and analyse problems or differences in practising PSC 
inspections.  A PSCO Exchange Programme has also been established to harmonize 
PSC procedures.  The Paris MOU has been successful in ensuring the quality of 
PSCOs, as most of the member States in the region have a developed maritime 
authority.  The Paris MOU also conducts seminars periodically and has initiated an 
advanced PSCO training program aiming at harmonizing inspection procedures and 
updating the professional ability of PSCOs.  However, one emerging problem for the 
Paris MOU countries is the availability of highly qualified PSCOs because of the 
declining shipping industry and the unwillingness of people to work at sea.   
Other regional MOUs have also carried out some PSCO education and training 
programs.  As most of the maritime authorities of these MOUs are still in a 
developing stage and many of them have limited financial support from their 
governments, the PSCOs’ ability to conduct a professional PSC inspection is still 
quite limited.  Even though the qualification and training requirements of PSCOs 
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have been stipulated in the IMO resolution A.787(19), as amended by Resolution 
A.882(21) and have been adopted in all the regional PSC MOUs, some countries still 
do not have the ability or willingness to follow these requirements, which may 
become a loophole in the international PSC regime. 
PSC inspection was initiated mainly for the interest of the State or ports at which 
foreign ships calls.  Different States may have different perspectives on the 
implementation of PSC.  Unavoidably, political decisions will always affect the 
decision on PSC inspections. (Tupper & Chick, 1999)  Nations who strongly 
advocate safety of life at sea and the protection of the environment tend to take a 
tougher stance on PSC inspections on substandard ships, while nations with strong 
competition from neighbouring ports might take a softer line in PSC inspections to 
attract more businesses to their ports.  Whatever interest a nation may have, national 
interests do affect the way PSC inspections are carried out.  Therefore, a strong 
commitment from the government of each country should be encouraged so that the 
goal of eliminating substandard ships can be achieved, and unfair competition 
between ports of different countries can be avoided.  Consequently, no country will 
suffer from taking a strong stance in PSC inspection.   
 
5.11 Cost Effectiveness of PSC 
Whether the cost of PSC should be covered by the shipping industry or not has 
always been a topic of argument.  According to Lord Donaldson (1994), charging 
ships for the cost of PSC inspection is justified on the basis that it is the shipping 
industry that puts sub-standard ships to sea, and therefore it is the shipping industry 
that should cover the costs of policing these ships.  However, the shipping industry 
has obvious concerns in this regard.  The most representative idea is articulated by 
Mr. Hunter, Vice President of Administration, Petroleum Shipping, in response to 
Lord Donaldson’s report (Douglas, 1999):  
On the idea that port-state inspections should be funded by a charge on 
shipping the owners again have their doubts.  While there is some sense in 
questioning why UK taxpayers should foot the bill for the failures of flag 
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states, making the responsible and law-abiding shipowner pay also has its 
problems.  Current port-state control thinking is that ships should only pay 
when a discovered deficiency requires a second or further visit. ‘We see no 
reason why this basic approach should be changed – innocent until proved 
guilty and then the guilty must pay.   
The author believes that the idea of Mr. Hunter is more justifiable and reasonable.  If 
all the costs of PSC inspections are levied on the ship, some countries may see this as 
an opportunity to increase the State’s revenue, which may quite possibly abuse the 
rationale of PSC and put the quality shipowners in a bad position.   
Obviously, the cost of carrying out PSC inspections is proportional to the 
inspection rate.  The more inspections a country conducts, the more costs will incur.  
For countries with higher labour costs, as in developed countries, the cost of PSC 
inspection will be much higher than in a developing country.  According to Payoyo 
(1994), approximately US$25M was spent to conduct about 125,000 inspections on 
95,000 individual ships before 1994, which means 200US$ may be spent for each 
inspection.  Today the amount must be much higher than the 200US$ cost before 
1994.  For the developed countries, this amount of money is affordable even though 
it may not be reasonable for the port States to bear the cost, which should obviously 
be the cost of the flag States.  However, this cost may be a heavy burden for those 
developing countries that stick to their commitment in eliminating substandard ships.  
Therefore, it is justifiable for the port States to charge those ships that have been 
found to be deficient and require further inspection, especially in the case of 
detention.  On the other hand, levying those unscrupulous shipowners may serve as 
an incentive to encourage them to use money in raising the quality of their ships.   
The adoption of the regional mechanism in conducting the PSC is surely a good 
choice in the cost sharing and cost recovery of PSC inspections.  However, it is 
important for all the member States to fulfil their commitment in the MOU.  For 
example, in the Paris MOU, each member is committed to inspect 25% of the 
internationally trading vessels visiting their ports each year whereas the Tokyo MOU 
only sets a regional target of 75%, which means each member is free to commit 
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whatever percentage it wishes to inspect. Statistics show that the inspection rates 
vary from over 85% to less than 1% among the Tokyo MOU members. (Tupper & 
Chick, 1999)  It is not fair to have some countries bear most of the burden.  Another 
problem that should be noticed is that increasing resources for PSC inspections alone 
cannot improve the cost effectiveness of PSC inspections.   Merely having a high 
inspection rate only improves the effectiveness of PSC but not its efficiency.  Using a 
scientific targeting system will not only optimise the use of limited resources, but 
also limit the cost of inspection by avoiding the inspection of quality ships.   
 
5.12 Conclusion 
From the analysis made in this chapter, it is clear that PSC has been successful 
in improving the ship quality operating in those regions where PSC has been carried 
out seriously.  However, it has not been very successful in changing many 
shipowners’ mind to upgrade the quality of their ships.  Many ships are still 
operating in a substandard manner.  The PSC regime itself still has lots of problems 
to be solved before a really effective PSC regime can be established in the whole 
world.  PSC can only be a supplement of flag State control, and will never supersede 
the key role of flag State in keeping their fleet up to international standard. 
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Chapter 6     
The impact of PSC regime on the 
implementation of SOLAS and MARPOL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
PSC as a way of promoting the implementation of international standards in the 
areas of safety and marine environmental protection has attracted more and more 
attention from the maritime regime.  It supplements, and many times overshadows, 
the role of the flag State in the enforcement of international maritime legislation, 
even though the PSC regime never means to replace the role of flag States and is 
mainly regarded as the last defence line in case other tiers of defence failed. 
The rapid development of the regional PSC MOUs is surely changing the 
shipping industry in its implementation of international standards, but how far the 
impact of PSC has made it is still difficult to determine.  Due to lack of information 
availability, the assessment of the PSC impact on the implementation of SOLAS and 
MARPOL conventions is mainly based on the statistics and other empirical data 
published by the Paris MOU. 
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6.2 Enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 standards under the 
Paris MOU 
The jurisdictional issues relevant to the power of the port States regarding 
marine environmental protection has been elaborated in Chapter 3.  It is generally 
agreed that port State enforcement is a promising solution to the problem of ship-
source pollution, even though hardly any evidence has been offered to prove this 
claim. (Payoyo, 1994)  The impact of the PSC regime on the implementation of 
MARPOL 73/78 has never been determined, despite some empirical studies in 
favour of the enforcement of the convention by port States. 
The MARPOL deficiencies are mainly categorized into deficiencies specified 
under the “MARPOL Annex I” and “MARPOL Annex II”.  Figures 16 and 17 show 
the ratio of deficiencies to individual ships under Annex I and Annex II of MARPOL 
respectively.   These figures show that the deficiencies under MARPOL Annex II 
have been decreasing consistently despite the increasingly stricter PSC inspections.  
It seems the PSC has been quite effective in eliminating substandard chemical 
tankers.  However, the deficiency rate under MARPOL Annex I has been stable since 
it reached its peak in 1996 until 1999, which follows the general pattern of overall 
deficiency rates describe in the previous Chapter 5.  The year 2000 saw a sharp 
increase in deficiency rates under Annex I, probably due to the enhanced targeting 
system launched in 2000.    
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Fig. 16. (Source: Paris MOU blue book 1999 and annual report 2000) 
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Fig. 17. (Source: Paris MOU blue book 1999) 
Figure 18 shows the ratio of deficiencies to individual ships related to MARPOL 
operational control.  The deficiency rate has more than doubled during the past 
several years.  It is difficult to conclude that the crew’s operational ability has 
deteriorated so badly, but at least it proves that the crew’s operational ability has not 
improved much.  One explanation of this big increase of the deficiency rates may be 
that the Paris MOU has given more and more attention to the inspection of 
operational procedures relating to safety and environmental protection during the 
past several years.    
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Fig. 18.  (Source: Paris MOU blue book 1999) 
Figures 19 and 20 give a general idea of the annual number and quantity of oil 
spills over 7 tons in the past 30 years.  From these two figures, it is obvious that both 
the number of ships who spilt oil and the quantity spilt have decreased consistently.  
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Table 4 gives the cause of oil spill incidences.  This table clearly indicates that most 
of the oil spill incidences result from routine operations such as loading, discharging 
and bunkering, which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals.  According to the 
International Tanker Owner Pollution Federation (ITOPF) (2001), the vast majority 
of accidents have been reported are less than 7 tons spill category, mostly due to 
operational problems of the ships involved.  In most of the past years, the 
operationally spilt oil actually exceeded the accidental spillage.  Considering the 
increasing number of operational deficiencies of crew under MARPOL Annex I 
identified in the PSC inspections, people may be more convinced of the importance 
of operational inspections.  Stricter inspection on crew’s operational competence will 
surely have an even more significant impact on the implementation of the MARPOL 
Convention.  It is obvious that PSC in operational areas should be one of the main 
areas for all the regional PSC MOUs to pay more attention. 
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Fig 19. (Source: ITOPF, 2001) 
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Annual quantity of oil spilt in the past 30 years 
 
Fig. 20. (Source: ITOPF, 2001) 
 
Table 4: Incidence of spills by cause, 1974-2000  
 < 7 tonnes  7-700 tonnes  > 700 tonnes  Total  
OPERATIONS      
Loading/discharging  2763 297 17  3077 
Bunkering  541 25 0  566 
Other operations  1165 47 0  1212 
ACCIDENTS      
Collisions  159 246 86  491 
Groundings  221 196 106  523 
Hull failures  561 77 43  681 
Fires & explosions    149  16 19  184 
OTHER/Unknown  2217 163 35  2415 
TOTAL  7776 1067 306  9149 
(Source: ITOPF, 2001) 
 
The PSC inspection results obviously prove the effectiveness of the Paris MOU.  
The fact that an increasing amount of deficiencies (as the inspections number has 
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increased) is discovered by PSC proves that the PSC regime has sustained its ability 
to enforce MARPOL standards.  The casualty and pollution statistics, which shows 
an improving standard, (O’neil, 2000) also prove that the PSC regime has exerted a 
positive impact on the implementation of MARPOL.  However, the deficiencies 
under Annex I, especially the increasingly higher rate of deficiencies for MARPOL 
operational procedures exists in the Paris MOU, show that the PSC regime has not 
completely changed the implementation of MARPOL standards.  In addition, the 
high violation rate in the Paris MOU region, which is already rigorously policing 
MARPOL violations, also gives a glimpse of the magnitude of MARPOL violations 
happening in the rest of the world.   
 
 
6.3 Enforcement of SOLAS standards under the Paris 
MOU 
The SOLAS Convention is generally regarded as the most important Convention 
of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.  The main 
objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum standards for the 
construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety.  The 
effective implementation of this convention is the key to the success of the 
international maritime regime in achieving its goal of protecting the safety of life and 
property at sea.   
The PSC concept was entrenched as early as 1929 in the SOLAS Convention.  
Nowadays, ensuring the proper implementation of the standards in the SOLAS 
Convention on board ship has always been the main job of PSC and will continue to 
be so in the future. 
The safety standards are included in the eleven technical chapters of the 
convention.  All these chapters are related to some areas of ship safety and should be 
fully complied with by applicable ships.  The following five figures from 21 to 25 
illustrate the deficiency ratio in some main areas related to the safety of ships, which 
were found in the Paris MOU.  Figure 21 and 22 show that the deficiency ratios 
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relating to fire fighting and life saving appliances have decreased since 1994 until 
1999.  The reasons for this trend are not only because these two areas have been the 
main concerns of PSC where deficiencies are relatively easier to find, (Sasamura, 
2000) but they are also the main areas where detainable deficiencies are detected. 
(Paris MOU blue book 1999)  The decreasing deficiency ratio indicates that the 
observance level in these areas has improved and the PSC efforts have been 
rewarded.  One important observation from this result is that the PSC can be 
effective in promoting the implementation of safety standards if the PSC regime is 
really concerned.  People may also noticed that almost all the deficiency rates 
increased significantly in 2000, when the enhanced targeting system was launched in 
the Paris MOU in order to target more specifically to those potentially high risk 
ships.   
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Fig. 21. (Source: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999 and Annual Report 2000) 
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Fig. 22.  (Source: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999 and Annual Report 2000) 
 76
The deficiency ratios relating to safety in general and navigation equipment are 
not encouraging.  From Figure 23 and 24, it is clear that the deficiency rates in these 
two areas fluctuate to a very small extent but increased sharply in 2000 due to the 
same reasons explained above.  The fact that the deficiency rates remain at a high 
level indicates that the shipping industry has not endeavoured much to improve its 
performance in these areas.  It seems the shipping industry has been working hard to 
eliminate deficiency in those areas where PSCOs have paid much attention, but does 
not make much effort to raise the whole quality level of the shipping industry.  
Obviouly, it is not a good idea for the shipping industry only to care about something 
the PSCOs have paid attention to because what the PSC regime is working for is to 
improve the quality level of shipping and not just expect the shipowners to rectify 
deficiencies PSCOs have detected.  It is time for the shipping industry to change its 
attitude towards PSCOs from the image of police at sea to a partner helping the 
shipping industry to improve the quality level of shipping. 
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Fig. 23.  (Resource: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999 and Annual Report 2000) 
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Ratio of deficiencies to individual ships x 100 navigational equipment 
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Fig. 24. (Source: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999 and Annual Report 2000) 
 
Figure 25 gives a clear indication of the rapidly increasing operational 
deficiencies detected by the Paris MOU.  The consistently increasing records of 
operational deficiencies related to safety, which has increased 83.6% during the last 
five years, should remind the shipping industry and flag States to recognize the 
seriousness of these figures and take sufficient measures to improve the operational 
safety on board ship.  It is generally recognized that human elements account for 
80% percent of accidents.  If this is true, the PSC regime should really exert much 
more effort in policing the crew’s competence in maintaining proper watch and in 
operating key equipment related to safety.  In doing this, it is important to raise the 
professional level of PSCOs first, as the inspection on crew’s competence is rather 
subjective and need a high level of knowledge and practical experience in the 
relevant areas.  The IMO resolution A.787(19) has given the minimum qualification 
requirements for PSCO in conducting operational control, which is essential for port 
States to follow if they want to conduct a proper PSC in operational procedures, even 
though these requirements were obviously compromised in the process of 
negotiation.   
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Ratio of deficiencies to individual ships x 100 SOLAS operational control 
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Fig. 25.  (Source: Paris MOU Blue Book 1999 and Annual Report 2000) 
 
6.4 PSC impact on the implementation of SOLAS and 
MARPOL 
It is clear that the effort of the PSC regime has promoted the implementation of 
MARPOL and SOLAS conventions to a significant extent.  However, this impact 
does not seem to be big enough to change the industry’s attitude towards 
implementation of international standards.  Lots of shipowners still try to operate 
their ships at the lowest acceptable level.  Quality shipping has not become a globally 
accepted idea.  The PSC regime itself does not seem to have worked so well as was 
expected.  Room still exists for the PSC regime to improve its performance and 
effectiveness.  To achieve the goal of a quality shipping, the PSC regime still has a 
long way to go in the future.   
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Chapter 7         
Recommendations and conclusion  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The world PSC regime has achieved partial success.  Nevertheless, room still 
exists for the PSC regime to improve its performance and effectiveness.  The 
improvement of PSC can be achieved in many ways, such as those areas discussed 
hereafter.  The main idea of these proposals and recommendations is to have all these 
regional PSC MOUs working together in a coordinated manner so that a worldwide 
PSC network can be established, which would effectively prevent the operation of 
substandard ships anywhere in the world.  The effectiveness of all these proposals 
and recommendations rely on the commitment of individual States and good 
cooperation between them. 
 
7.2 Uniformity of PSC  
It is generally recognized that inspection standards and procedures vary greatly 
throughout the world and even among members of regional MOUs for various 
reasons.  This non-uniformity of PSC standards and procedures has not only brought 
a lot of inconvenience to the shipping industry, but also has undermined the 
reputation of the world PSC regime as an effective means in promoting the 
implementation of international standards.  The Paris MOU has been in a much 
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better position in this respect, since the MOU has been operating for about twenty 
years successfully and its member States are mostly developed countries.  The Tokyo 
MOU has been progressing quite well in this respect, as much of the work done since 
the inception of the Asia-Pacific MOU has been directed towards the training of 
PSCOs and the development of inspection standards and procedures to establish 
uniformity of inspection and consistency of decisions and actions by member states.  
Other regional MOUs are still progressing with the assistance of IMO through its 
technical cooperation programs. (Rose, 2001)  
To promote the uniformity of PSC, some measures should be taken.  First, each 
region should produce a consistent PSC manual, preferable based on the Paris MOU 
manual.  Second, the regional MOUs should take advantage of the guidelines, 
standards and model courses for PSC inspections, which are produced and 
continuously updated by the IMO and ILO in training their PSCOs.  Third, technical 
cooperation such as PSCO training and exchanging should be encouraged and 
strengthened among individual regional MOUs and inter-regionally.   
No doubt there is still a long way to go before the world PSC regime can work in 
a harmonized and uniform manner and its success will largely depend on the political 
commitment and support of all the relevant State governments.  However, the 
importance of uniformity of PSC should never be underestimated.  The PSC regime 
can never be fully effective if the PSC cannot be carried out in a harmonized and 
consistent way. 
 
7.3 Promoting the exchange of information 
Promoting the information exchange will greatly improve the performance of 
PSC in some way.    The most obvious advantage of the information exchange is to 
avoid too frequent PSC inspections on ships, especially on quality ships, while at the 
same time save valuable inspection resources and cost to inspect the potential high-
risk ships.   The second advantage of information exchange is to increase the 
knowledge of substandard shipping.  This knowledge is not only useful in itself, but 
will also benefit the maritime community with the opportunity to better analyse the 
 81
causes of incidents and casualties and to make sure, more accurately than ever 
before, how they can be prevented from occurring again.  The third advantage of 
improved information exchange is the potential of working towards the change of 
attitude within the shipping industry, where a long tradition of secrecy has frequently 
resulted in problems being hidden and ignored rather than revealed and solved.  
Hopefully, there may be the chance to challenge this culture and replace secrecy with 
transparency and openness. (Hoppe, 2000) 
The information exchange can be enhanced mainly by improving contact 
mechanisms amongst the MOU secretariats and by facilitating the flow of 
information between MOU Information Centres on action taken against sub-standard 
shipping.  The first and the most important step to achieve this goal is the 
establishment of regional databases.  So far only half of the MOUs have a computer 
network enabling their member states to store their inspection data in a central 
database for use by other members, none of which are able to satisfactorily exchange 
data with any of the others due to problems with technical IT compatibility (Rose, 
2001).  The technical and financial limitations, especially for those newly established 
MOUs, are the main reasons for this situation.  The second important step that needs 
to be taken is facilitating the exchange of data between individual regional MOUs.  A 
limited facility for exchange of data between the Paris MOU and the USCG and the 
Asia-Pacific MOU has been achieved.  Preliminary discussion between the Paris 
MOU and the USCG has initiated on interchange of data.  According to the progress 
made over past years with the development of MOU databases and computer 
networks and the establishment of interregional exchange, it is difficult to see a 
satisfactory interchange of PSC inspection data between all of the MOUs that will be 
in place in the near future.   
To promote information exchange, all the regional computer databases should be 
accessible to their member states and preferably be compatible with all the other 
MOUs.  Those MOUs which are now in the process of establishing databases or not 
yet started really should notice this problem, so that they do not have to refurbish 
their system in the future.  The Black Sea MOU is a good example that has adopted 
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the same system from the Tokyo MOU.  An alternative is to establish a central 
database at the IMO, which is a good choice but difficult to agree by those MOUs.   
The objective of these databases is to provide all administrations with an easy 
access to all PSC inspection results in a timely manner.  To make these accesses 
useful, the information in these databases should be kept as accurate as possible by 
means of appropriate procedures and audit arrangements as well as extensive training 
programmes. (Rose, 2001) 
In June 2000 the IMO held a workshop discussing common experiences in the 
implementation of PSC, harmonization and co-ordination of PSC procedures, 
exchange of information between MOUs and technical co-operation matters. (IMO, 
Oct. 2000)  The secretaries and database managers of all the regional MOUs, USCG, 
ILO and EQUASIS attended the workshop.  Some recommendations were adopted to 
be considered by the MOU committees aiming at developing closer ties and 
cooperation between the regional MOUs.  These recommendations include: 
1. Admit the secretariats of other MOUs as observers in order to ensure a 
continuous exchange of information, expertise and practices in the 
implementation and co-ordination of PSC activities; 
2. Consider sharing regional information exchange systems with other PSC 
regions; 
3. Develop a common coding system for recording inspection and action data; 
4. Establish a “Contact Group on the Harmonization of Information Exchange” 
with the following terms of reference: 
• To exchange views and information on PSC information systems. 
• To prepare proposals to facilitate the exchange of interregional 
information; 
• To contact the ISO Working Group on Product Structure Directory 
Standard for Ships ISO/NP 16917 in order to be associated with its 
on-going work on the harmonization of PSC related data; 
• To review and compare existing PSC coding systems; 
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• To explore the possibilities whether or not existing codes could be 
combined, harmonised or otherwise modified to form a common 
coding system; 
• To share progress and results on the development of a common 
coding system with the FSI Correspondence Group on Certain 
Aspects of PSC. 
Obviously, the individual MOUs have recognized most of the problems that 
existed with regard to information exchange and have worked out quite 
comprehensive measures in promoting the information exchange.  However, the 
most difficult problem is to implement these measures in all the MOUs.   
 
7.4 Promoting Transparency  
For the success of the PSC, there is an urgent need for more transparency.  The 
shipping industry has a long tradition of secrecy culture, which has frequently 
resulted in problems being hidden and ignored rather than revealed and solved 
(Hoppe, 2000).  To solve this problem, the PSC regime should work hard to 
challenge this culture and replace secrecy with transparency and openness.   
The goal of promoting transparency can be achieved by making more relevant 
information available to the public, especially to those interested parties.  Just as 
what Cubbin (2001) has said, transparency could not be the solution in eliminating 
substandard ships but surely it is a step in the right direction.  Some shipowners still 
consider the risk of non-compliance to be outweighed by their commercial interest or 
survival in a harsh market.  Some relevant industry players are still more concerned 
about their market share rather than the problem of substandard shipping.  However, 
exposing them to the public will surely benefit this world by raising the quality level 
of the whole shipping industry.  First, enhanced transparency will give the quality 
operators a better playing field, as many charterers will under pressure not choose 
bad quality ships.  This trend has already emerged in the US where many major oil 
companies are under public pressure not to charter ships with bad records.  Second, it 
provides an opportunity for cooperation between administrators and responsible 
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industry players in improving standards on health, maritime safety and marine 
environmental protection, because of the availability of more information on the 
problems identified.  Third, it will press the industry to pay more attention to its self-
regulating mechanism so that bad quality ships will be eliminated by their own 
initiatives.  
The information accessible to the public should be as much as possible.  
Preferably it should include the records and the results of the flag State surveys.  
Other information may include the names of all the parties involved in the ships’ 
business, for example the owner, class, shippers, charters, cargo owners, insurers and 
P&I clubs. (Ulstrup, 2001)   Just as Mr. Hare (1997) says:  
Let the brokers of the world know what ships have been detained and why.  
Let the world's insurers know who the miscreants are.  Let the consumer, 
passenger or cargo shipper, know who the delinquents are and let them avoid 
using substandard ships as an effective means of ridding the oceans of their 
scourge.   
One of the important measures that have been taken to improve transparency is 
to publish detention information.  Initially port States were reluctant to publish 
detention information in fear of damage suits by agonized ship-owners. (Hare, 1997)  
However, this method has been so popularly adopted that now it has become a norm 
in getting more transparency.  People are now quite used to getting information of 
ships detained, which are regularly published in Lloyds List (UK, Australia, Canada 
and the US, on a monthly basis) and even on the Internet.  
An important step towards increased transparency is the launching of EQUASIS 
system on 23 May 2000.  The system now contains basic details about the ship, its 
classification, its SMC, its P&I cover, ship owner memberships (Intertanko and 
Intercargo, in the near future ISMA, as well), the existence of an ITF agreement and 
both current and historical details about its name, flag, owner, manager and class 
society on most of the worlds merchant ships (about 66, 000 ships over 100GT).  
Information of other ships in the same manager’s fleet is also accessible in the same 
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way.  PSC information from the Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG are input into 
this system, which includes the date and place of inspections, details of the type and 
number of deficiencies and whether the vessel was detained.  Additional information 
on the number and type of the detainable deficiencies and the duration of detention is 
given in case of detention.  Unfortunately only the Paris MOU is currently providing 
all of the inspection information weekly.  The USCG provides inspection 
information quarterly and detention information monthly. The Asia Pacific MOU has 
supplied data relating to inspection information only. (Rose, 2001)  The management 
unit of the system is continuously working on increasing the reliability as well as the 
type and extent of information being recorded.  The implementation of a more 
comprehensive “human element module” in the database (with PSC information and 
connections to ILO and ITF databases) is now being taken into account.  The unit 
also discussed with the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the 
Chemical Distributions Institute (CDI) earlier this year with regard to providing 
PSCOs access through EQUASIS to information in the OCIMF and CDI databases.  
Furthermore, closer co-operation with IACS is in the process of discussion.   
Current usage of the system is increasing slowly but steadily: about 1,600 users 
consult the database each month, which means more than 60,000 hits a month (Rose, 
2001).  However, so far it is not popularly used in the PSC regimes.  One feasible 
way of using this system by the PSCOs to obtain information about substandard 
ships may be to first gain an overview of the ship from EQUASIS,  then to obtain 
this from the regional MOU’s databases if greater detail is needed.  This facility is 
sure some time away, but may be something to work towards. 
The EQUASIS is now developing into a genuinely international system where 
currently France, Japan, Spain, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the USCG, IMO and 
the European Commission are participating in the establishment and supervision of 
the system.  It is essential to promote the EQUASIS so that it may become an 
international system, which can be accessed by all sectors of the industry in the 
identification of substandard ships and shipping.  Hopefully, this database will 
provide an overview of the history of each particular ship in the future.  The 
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EQUASIS website gives detail information about the system (www.equasis.org).   
Surely enough, the EQUASIS project is a positive action towards the improvement 
of information transparency relating to ship safety and environmental protection.  
However, this project still needs to improve the coverage of the information 
resources such as the PSC information from other regional MOU where the IMO 
may play a more active role in promoting this project.   
Relevant parties should be encouraged to take advantage of this greater 
transparency, especially for charterers and insurers, in discriminating ships when 
they were contemplating business. (BIMCO, 1998).  If all the relevant parties can 
make full use of this valuable transparency of information, and avoid using bad 
quality ships, the substandard ships will surely be eradicated much easier.  
 
7.5 Tougher target system 
PSC is a strong medicine to cure a sick industry, (Hare, 1997) however, it is 
nothing less than a confounded nuisance to the operator of a well-founded ship and 
her officers (Tougher targeting, 1998).  PSC inspections without distinguishing 
between the responsible and the rogue operator is a weakness in terms of both safety 
enforcement and the provision of a level playing field for good shipowners. (Cubbin, 
2001)  The targeting systems practised in the Paris MOU and USCG are good 
examples for identifying high risk ships for priority inspections while leaving ships 
of prudent shipowners “in peace” as a reward for their good performance.  At the 
same time the precious PSC resources can be utilised more productively.  The other 
MOUs should be recommended to follow these examples especially considering their 
relatively shortage of resources so that the relatively high percentage of substandard 
ships can be targeted more precisely.  Of course, this goal will rely on the availability 
of a better database, which will enable the more precise targeting to take place.  The 
IMO should take measures to encourage the developed MOUs to help those 
undeveloped MOUs in establishing globally compatible inspection databases and 
developing tailored targeting system, which are sensible to their specific situations.  
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The goal of the targeting system is to develop a new PSC culture of qualitative rather 
than quantitative inspections. 
 
7.6 Maintain a balance 
It is important for the PSC regime not to go extreme whether it is too strict or too 
loose.  There is a natural tendency for a system to continuously raise the stands 
aimed for once it is established and the first level objectives have been achieved, 
partly to justify the perpetuation of the system.  In terms of PSC, there exists a 
danger that PSC may be used for trade sanction purposes, or as a way of extortion by 
unscrupulous authorities if the PSC regime goes too far away from its original 
objective of promoting the implementation of international standards. 
On the other hand, it should be noticed that the PSC regime should not be 
developed into another tier of “loose net”, which will not effectively improve the 
quality level of shipping but impose another burden to shipowners.  So far as an 
emergent MOU is concerned, a phase-in period should be provided for the owners 
and operators, during which local and regional shipping not hitherto subjected to 
standards and inspections have an opportunity to come up to the required levels.  The 
individual maritime authority in the region should sensitise, encourage and, where 
appropriate, assist the regional shipping community during the phase-in period.  The 
length of the phase-in period will depend on the regional conditions, but typically 
this would be at least six months, once the regional administrations have the 
capability to commence effective PSC activities. (Rial, 1999) 
 
7.7 Human factor 
As most people agree that human element accounts for the majority of maritime 
accidents, it is important for the PSC regime to address the human factor properly.  
The human factor problem should be addressed in two facets.  The first is how to 
improve the competence and performance of the crew who are directly responsible 
for the safety of the ship.  This should be done by enhancing the operational 
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inspection of the crew especially those in charge of key operations.  A more detailed 
and standard guidance for operational inspection should be adopted to help PSCOs to 
conduct the operational inspections. 
The second is to improve the professional capability of PSCOs in conducting 
professional PSC inspections.  Internationally agreed training and qualification 
requirements for PSCO are important in harmonizing the standards applied and 
improve the professional level of PSC inspection especially in those newly emerged 
MOUs.  People are not only the main cause of most accidents, but also the best 
means to prevent them when procedures are learned and effectively applied (Plaza, 
2000).  In this respect, the IMO should take a more active role in encouraging the 
regional MOUs to pay more attention to the professional capability of PSCOs so that 
the effectiveness of PSC will not be undermined and abused by unqualified PSCOs.   
 
7.8 Incentive to shipowners 
It is clear that shipowners have the ultimate responsibility to keep their ships up 
to international standards.  However, many of them obviously did not fulfil their 
obligation for various reasons.  Some incentives to shipowners should be developed 
to encourage them to live up to the requirements.  Historically, the PSC regime has 
mainly used the “stick” policy in penalizing the shipowners of substandard ships in 
order to instigate their motive in improving their safety performance.  Experience 
shows that this method does not seem to work very effective.  Sometimes a “carrot” 
policy may work better.  A positive way is to differentiate between good and bad 
ships and owners.  Incentive should work in such a way that the prudent shipowners 
will find it worthwhile to run their ships in a continuously quality manner, while the 
substandard shipowners will find it not sensible to run their ships in a substandard 
manner anymore.  Rotterdam’s “Green Ship” program (See detail from 
http://www.greenaward.org/defaulthome.htm) is a good example.   
One of the main reasons why so many ships are managed in substandard 
condition is for financial concern.  The shipping industry as a whole has been 
running in deficit since 1973 because of the huge surplus, initially of tankers and 
 89
then ships of actually all types. (Gray, 2000)  A losing industry has a high pressure to 
cut costs, so cutting corners become ferocious.  According to an OECD report 
(1996), the margin of substandard operation can be up to a 15 per cent saving on the 
annual running cost for a vessel at the common practice level, which is a significant 
margin in such a competitive and unprofitable shipping market nowadays.  Giving 
some financial advantage to those honest shipowners, who have invested large 
amounts of money in keeping their ships in a high standard, and discouraging those 
substandard shipowners by strict and frequent PSC inspections so that they will not 
get an advantage by running their ships in a substandard condition may be a good 
solution to improving the shipping quality.  The Qualiship 21 (see Appendix G for 
detail) program initiated by the USCG, which has been devised according to the 
above-mentioned principle, seems to be a very good idea and should be 
recommended to other PSC MOUs.  In this respect, IMO should take measures to 
encourage port States to investigate initiatives to substantially offset any commercial 
advantage accrued by the operation of substandard ships, preferably at a regional 
basis or even in a globally consistent initiative, so that shipowners will not be 
tempted to run their fleet in a substandard manner in order to get financial advantage.  
This is important just as Mr. Williamson (1996) pointed out: “substandard ships and 
crew will continue to ply the world’s seaways until it is made uneconomic to operate 
them”.   
 
7.9 Incentive to flag States 
Almost everybody agrees that the prime responsibility of ensuring the quality of 
ships lies with the flag States.  However, so far the world PSC regime has mainly 
taken a “stick and carrot” policy towards the shipping industry and not the flag 
States.  Not many effective measures have been taken towards the flag States, 
probably because of political concerns.  To encourage the flag States to fulfil their 
responsibility imposed by the accepted international legislations, some incentives to 
flag States should be considered.  
 90
In the Paris MOU report to the International Commission on Shipping (ICONS) 
(2001), some radical but probably feasible suggestions were provided as follows: 
1. The flag States are suggested to suspend the registration of any ship that is 
detained twice within a year.  While at the mean time the port States should 
be authorized to notice those flag States below an acceptable level of quality 
that ships flying their flags will no longer be allowed to load or unload 
cargo in their ports.   
2. Flag States in flagrant disregard of their responsibilities should be publicly 
criticised for example in IMO.  Member States whose PSC performance are 
consistently in the category of high risk may be suspended of their 
membership as these countries contribute nothing except enjoying their 
rights and privileges and continuously ignore their corresponding 
responsibilities. 
3. Flag States with consistently high-risk detention rates may be further 
penalized by refusing recognision of certificates issued by them.   
These measures may be difficult to adopt in IMO because some States may 
strongly be against these proposals.  However, it should be remembered that the 
mission of eliminating substandard ships would not succeed without the commitment 
of flag States.  Radical measures will not be welcomed by many people but 
sometimes they really work, such as the OPA 90, which was opposed by most of the 
world, but it produced excellent results. (Gray, 2000)  A “stick and carrot policy” 
should also be used against flag States consistently ignoring their responsibilities so 
that one day these States may realize that fulfiling their responsibilities is something 
worth doing.   
More pressure should be put to encourage the flag States to complete the IMO 
self-assessment form.  Theoretically, it is a very good idea in improving the 
performance of flags States.  Nevertheless, so far very few countries have completed 
this form for various reasons.  Of course one of the main reasons is that it is not a 
compulsory requirement.  It is advised that IMO should take measures to make this 
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requirement compulsory by putting it in the relevant conventions, just as the self-
assessment requirement entrenched in the STCW 78/95 Convention. 
  
7.10 Implementing ISM Code 
The ISM Code came into force for certain categories of ships 1 July 1998 and 
will be fully applicably to all ships after 1 July 2002.  So far it is still too early to 
conclude whether the ISM Code has succeeded in its long-term aim of raising 
standards of safety management on board ships and providing transparent 
accountability stretching back to the operator. (Cubbin, 2001)  However, it surely 
provides the port States a tool to assess the shipowners whether they have fulfiled 
their responsibility in maintaining a quality fleet complying with international 
standards by operating an effective safety management system.  For example, in the 
“Amoco Cadiz” accident, which happened in March 1978, the ship spilled 220,000 
tons of crude oil cargo because of the seriously deficient steering gear right from 
delivery.  Further, her management knew it and deliberately decided not to repair it 
twice because of economical concerns. (Gray, 2000)  The unseaworthiness of the 
obvious substandard ship is very unlikely to have been detected even if the PSC 
system had been existing at that time, since it was nearly a new ship operated by a 
US major oil company, with clearly well trained Italian crew of probably 28 or 30 on 
time charter to a European oil major.  It is a ship hardly being targeted, or to become 
suspicious about even with a fairly thorough “walk around” PSC inspection in port.   
Obviously this problem could have been solved if the company were operating an 
effective Safety Management System (SMS).  
 From the PSC point of view, what the PSC regime should do is to inspect the 
ship’s SMS more strictly to make sure the SMSs are running properly in the ships 
and their company.  Despite the fact that the ISM Code contributed to the overall 
improvement in ship quality to some extent, there were notable exceptions indicating 
that some managing companies still did not take the ISM Code seriously. (USCG 
annual report 2000)  People are worrying that the ISM could lead to paper work if it 
is not implement properly.  The Paris MOU annual report (2001) says that in the year 
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2000, 929 ISM related deficiencies were recorded, an increase of 87% when 
compared with 1999.  This is a clear indication that many shipowners still consider 
the ISM as a burden imposed by IMO but not regard it as a good opportunity and tool 
to improve their safety management level.  The ISM Code is good, but worth nothing 
if it cannot be implemented properly.  According to the Paris MOU (2001), a new 
CIC is going to be carried out when the second stage of ISM implementation begin, 
which is 1 July 2002.  Surely it will promote the implementation of ISM, but it will 
be more effective if all the existing regional MOUs can coordinate together to carry 
out a similar CIC as the Paris MOU, so that those substandard shipowners and their 
ships will find nowhere to hide. 
 
7.11 Conclusion 
The ultimate responsibility of keeping the ship in compliance with international 
standards lies with the shipowner, flag States and other relevant industry players.  
The development of the PSC regime is the world reaction to the failure of 
shipowners and flag States in fulfiling their responsibilities.  PSC is only a 
supplement but not a substitute for flag States enforcement, and it is in no way 
responsible for foreign ship’s safety standards.  It does not relieve the responsibility 
of flag states, owners and other relevant industry players imposed by international 
legislation to do their jobs properly and responsibly. 
The legality and procedures of PSC are clearly developed.  It is most effective if 
PSC is carried out on a regional basis.  With the development of regional PSC 
MOUs, the PSC regime is recognized by the world maritime regime as a more and 
more effective means of ridding the world's ports and oceans of sub-standard, 
unseaworthy and dangerous ships.  So far, the PSC regime has achieved partial 
success in promoting the quality level of shipping, and has had an impact on the 
implementation of the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions.  However, the success is 
not good enough to satisfy the public hope of eliminating substandard shipowners 
and their ships. 
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To make the PSC regime more effective, there is still a lot of work to be done.  
Measures in improving the effectiveness of PSC included harmonized inspection and 
detention procedures, enhanced transparency through increased information 
exchange within regions and inter-regionally and incentives for the shipowners and 
flag State to encourage them in improving their performance.  In doing this, IMO can 
play a more active role so that all these measures can be taken in a globally 
harmonized manner.   
 After all, until such time as owners, operators, other industry players and flag 
States accept and fulfil their responsibilities, the most viable alternative in 
eradicating substandard shipping is an effective world PSC regime.  
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1.           Summary of status of conventions 
as at 31 May 2001 
 
 
Convention Entry into force 
date 
No. of Contracting 
States 
Percent of world 
tonnage 
IMO Convention 17-Mar-58 158 98.57 
SOLAS 1974 25-May-80 144 98.45 
SOLAS Protocol 
1978 01-May-81 98 94.37 
SOLAS Protocol 
1988 03-Feb-00 50 61.59 
LL 1966 21-Jul-68 146 98.44 
LL Protocol 1988 03-Feb-00 47 61.34 
TONNAGE 1969 18-Jul-82 129 98.18 
COLREG 1972 15-Jul-77 138 97.05 
SFV Protocol 1993 - 7 7.53 
STCW 1978 28-Apr-84 136 97.96 
STCW-F 1995 - 2 3.12 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex I/II) 02-Oct-83 114 94.43 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex III) 01-Jul-92 96 80.20 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex IV) - 80 44.94 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex V) 31-Dec-88 100 86.39 
MARPOL Protocol 
1997 (Annex VI) - 3 8.42 
OPRC 1990 13-May-95 59 48.11 
CLC 1969 19-Jun-75 56 8.49 
CLC Protocol 1992 30-May-96 68 87.55 
FUND 1971 16-Oct-78 32 4.35 
FUND Protocol 
1992 30-May-96 64 83.53 
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Appendix C:  Table 2   USCG Boarding Priority Matrix 
 
 
       Appendix 2 - Boarding Priority 
Matrix 
 
 
OWNER 
 
5 Points 
 
Listed Owner 
or Operator 
 
FLAG 
 
7 Points 
 
Listed Flag 
State 
CLASS 
 
Priority 1 
 
>10 arrivals with detention 
ratio more than 4 times the 
average OR <10 arrivals 
and involved with at least 
one detention in the 
previous 3 years. 
 
5 Points 
>10 arrivals with a 
detention ratio between 3 & 
4 times the average. 
 
3 Points 
>10 arrivals with a 
detention ratio between 2 & 
3 times the average. 
 
1 Point 
>10 arrivals with a 
detention ratio between the 
average and twice the 
average. 
 
0 Points 
>10 arrivals with a 
detention ratio below the 
average OR 
<10 arrivals with no 
detentions in the previous 3 
years. 
HISTORY 
 
5 Points Each 
 
Detention 
within the 
previous 12 
months. 
 
1 Point Each 
Other 
operational 
control within 
the previous 12 
months 
 
1 Point Each 
Casualty within 
the previous 12 
months. 
 
1 Point Each 
Violation 
within the 
previous 12 
months. 
 
1 Point Each 
Not boarded 
within the 
previous  6 
months. 
SHIP TYPE 
 
1 Point 
 
Oil or chemical 
Tanker 
 
1 Point 
Gas Carrier 
 
2 Points 
Bulk Freighter 
over 10 years 
old. 
 
1 Point 
Passenger Ship 
 
2 Points 
Carrying low 
value 
commodities in 
bulk. 
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Priority I vessels:  
• 17 or more points on the Matrix, or  
• ships involved in a marine casualty that may have affected seaworthiness, or  
• USCG Captain of the Port determines a vessel to be a potential hazard to the port or the 
environment, or  
• ships whose classification society has ten or more arrivals the previous year and a 
detention ratio more than four times the average, or  
• ships whose classification society has less than ten arrivals the previous year and have 
been associated with at least one detention.  
• Port entry may be restricted until vessel is examined by the Coast Guard.  
 
Priority II vessels:  
• 7 to 16 points on the Matrix, or  
• outstanding requirements from a previous boarding in this or another U.S. port, or the 
vessel is overdue for an annual tank or passenger exam.  
• Cargo operations may be restricted until vessel is examined by the Coast Guard.  
 
Priority III vessels:  
• 4 to 6 points on the Matrix, or  
• alleged deficiencies reported, or  
• the vessel is overdue for an annual freight examination, or quarterly passenger vessel re-
exam.  
• No operational restrictions imposed; vessel will most likely be examined at dock.  
 
Priority IV vessels:  
• 3 or fewer points on the Matrix.  
• Vessel is a low risk, and will probably not be boarded. 
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Appendix D:  Table 3 
PORT STATE CONTROL AGREEMENTS: COMPARATIVE TABLE 
 Paris MOU Acuerdo de Vina del Mar 
Participating  18  12 
Maritime  Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Authorities  France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,Ireland, Italy, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
and associate Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Uruguay, Venezuela 
Members Federation, Spain, Sweden, UK  
Observers Japan, USA, IMO, ILO, Tokyo MOU, Caribbean 
MOU, Slovenia 
IMO, ROCRAM 
Target 25% annual inspection rate per country 15% annual inspection rate per country within 
inspection rate  3 years 
Relevant LL 1966 and LL PROT 1988 LL 1966 
instruments SOLAS 1974 SOLAS 1974 
 SOLAS PROT 1978, 1988 - SOLAS PROT 1978 
 MARPOL 73/78 MARPOL 73/78 
 STCW 1978 STCW 1978 
 COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972 
 TONNAGE 69 TONNAGE 69 
 ILO Convention No. 147  
Inspection 
priorities  
Overriding priority 
- ships which have been reported by pilots or  
- passenger ships, ro-ro ships, bulk carriers 
 port authorities as being deficient - ships which may present a special hazard 
 - ships which have been subject of a report by  
 the master, a crew member, etc.  
 - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods - ships which have had several recent 
 which have failed to report relevant deficiencies 
 information  
 - ships which have been suspended from class  
 during the preceding 6 months  
 Target factor  
 Generic element  
 -flag State on Black list  
 -targeted ship type  
 -Non EU recognized classification society  
 -age of the ship  
 -class deficiency ratio  
 -above average  
 -flag  
 Historic Element:  
 -Entering region for the first time in the last 12 
months 
 
 -not inspected  in  the last 6 months  
 -previous detention in the last 12 months  
 -number of deficiencies during last 12 months  
Amendments will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at the 
end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at the 
end of any different  period determined unanimously 
by the representatives of the authorities in the 
Committee 
Information Centre Administratif des Affaires Maritimes Centro de Informacion del Acuerdo 
Centre (CAAM), Saint-Malo, France Latinoamericano (CIALA), Prefectura Naval 
  Argentina, Buenos Aires 
Committee a representative of each of the authorities and a representative of each of the authorities 
 the EC Commission  
Secretariat The Hague, The Netherlands Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 Mr. R.W.J. Schiferli Mr. Juan Jose Beltritti 
 Secretary of the Paris MOU Prefecto Mayor 
 Nieuwe Uitleg 1 Vina del Mar Agreement Secretariat 
 2514 BP The Hague, The Netherlands Prefectura Naval Argentina 
 Tel: +31 70 351 1509 Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 Fax: +31 70 351 1599 Tel: +54 1 318 7455            Fax: +54 1 318 7547 
Signed 1 July 1982 5 November 1992 
Official English, French Spanish, Portuguese 
Languages   
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 Tokyo MOU Caribbean MOU 
Maritime 
Participating  
18--Australia, Canada, China, Fiji, Indonesia, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New 
23--Anguilla*, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda*, British 
Authorities and Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,* Virgin Islands*, Cayman Islands, Cuba,  
Associate 
Members 
Russian Federation, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands*, Thailand, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, 
Dominica*, Dominican Republic*,Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti*,Jamaica, Montserrat*, 
Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts & Nevis*, 
 Hong Kong(China) Saint Lucia*, Saint Vincent& the Grenadines*,
  Suriname*, Trinidad & Tobago, 
  Turks & Caicos Islands* 
Observers Brunei, USA, IMO, ILO, ESCAP, Paris MOU, IMO, ILO, CARICOM, IACS, Canada, USA, 
 Indian Ocean MOU, Solomon Islands* Paris MOU, Vina del Mar MOU, Tokyo MOU 
Target 75% annual regional inspection rate by the  15% annual inspection rate per country within 
inspection rate year 2000  3 years 
Relevant LL 1966 and LL PROT 88 LL 1966 
instruments SOLAS 1974,  SOLAS PROT 1978 and 88 SOLAS 1974 , SOLAS PROT 1978 
 MARPOL 73/78 MARPOL 73/78 
 STCW 1978 STCW 1978 
 COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972 
 ILO Convention No. 147 ILO Convention No. 147 
Inspection - passenger ships, ro-ro ships, bulk carriers - ships visiting a port for the first time or after  
priorities - ships which may present a special hazard an absence of 12 months or more 
 - ships visiting a port for the first time or after 
an absence of 12 months or more 
- ships which have been permitted to leave 
the port of a State with deficiencies to be 
 - ships flying the flag of a State appearing in  rectified, upon expiry of such period 
 the 3-year rolling average table of above- - ships which have been reported by pilots or 
 average detentions port authorities as being deficient 
 - ships which have been permitted to leave the  - ships whose certificates are not in order 
 port of a State with deficiencies to be rectified - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods 
 - ships which have been reported by pilots or which have failed to report relevant 
 port authorities as being deficient information 
 - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods - ships which have been suspended from  
 which have failed to report relevant information class in the preceding 6 months 
 -ships which have been suspended from their  
 class for safety reasons in the course of the   
 preceding six months  
 -ships proceeding to sea without complying   
 With the conditions set by the port State  
 -type of ships identified by the Committee from  
 time to time as warranting priority inspections  
Amendments will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
Information Asia-Pacific Computerized Information System Information Centre Curagao, Netherlands 
Centre (APCIS), Vladivostok, Russia Antilles 
Committee a representative of each of the authorities a representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat Tokyo, Japan St. Michael, Barbados 
 Mr. Y. Sasamura Mrs. Valerie Browne 
 Secretary, Tokyo MOU Secretariat Secretary of the Caribbean MOU 
 Tomoecho Annex Building 6F International Transport Division 
 3-8-26, Toranomon Herbert House 
 Minato-Ku, Tokyo Fontabelle 
 Japan 105 St. Michael, Barbados 
 Tel: +81 3 3433 0621 Tel: +246 430 7507 
 Fax: +81 3 3433 0624 Fax: +246 436 4828 
Signed 2 December 1993 9 February 1996 
Official English English 
languages   
 
*Acceptance pending. 
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 Mediterranean MOU Indian Ocean MOU 
Participating  11  18 
Maritime 
Authorities and 
Algeria*, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta,  Australia, Bangladesh*, Djibouti*, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives,  
Associate Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and the Mauritius,Mozambique*, Myanmar*,  
Members Palestinian Authority* Seychelles*,South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,  
  Tanzania,Yemen* 
Observers IMO, ILO, EC IMO, ILO, PMAESA 
Target 15% annual inspection rate per country within 10% annual inspection rate per country within 
inspection rate 3 years 3 years 
Relevant LL 1966 LL 1966 
instruments SOLAS 1974 SOLAS 1974 
 SOLAS PROT 1978 SOLAS PROT 1978 
 MARPOL 73/78 MARPOL 73/78 
 STCW 1978 STCW 1978 
 COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972 
 ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69 
  ILO Convention No. 147 
 - ships visiting a port of a State for the first time - ships visiting a port of a State for the first time 
Inspection or after an absence of 12 months or more  or after an absence of 12 months or more 
priorities - ships which have been permitted to leave the - ships which have been permitted to leave the 
 port of a State with deficiencies to be rectified port of a State with deficiencies to be rectified 
 - ships which have been reported by pilots or - ships which have been reported by pilots or 
 port authorities as being deficient port authorities as being deficient 
 - ships whose certificates are not in order - ships whose certificates are not in order 
 - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods 
 which have failed to report relevant which have failed to report relevant 
 information information 
 - ships which have been suspended from class - ships which have been suspended from class 
 in the preceding 6 months in the preceding 6 months 
Amendments will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
Information Information Center Casablanca, Morocco Information Centre Goa, India 
Centre   
Committee a representative of each of the authorities a representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat Alexandria, Egypt Goa, India 
 Adm. Hani Hosni Mr. B. Ganguli 
 Secretary, Mediterranean PSC Secretariat Secretary I.O.M.O.U. Secretariat 
 27 Admiral Hamza Pasha Street Head Land, Sada 
 Roushdy Near Antarctic Study Centre 
 Alexandria, Egypt Vasco-da-Gama 
 Tel: +203 544 6538/5446537/5427949 Goa 403 804, India 
 Fax: +203 546 6360 Tel: +91 834 519383 
  Fax: +91 834 519383 
Signed 11 July 1997 5 June 1998 
Official English, French and Arabic English 
languages   
 
*Acceptance pending. 
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 West and Central African MOU Black Sea MOU 
Participating  16 6 
Maritime  Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian 
Authorities  Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Federation, Turkey, Ukraine 
and associate Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra  
Members Leone, South Africa, Togo  
Observers IMO, ILO, MOWCA IMO, ILO 
Target 15% annual inspection rate per country within 15% annual inspection rate per country  
inspection rate 3 years within 3 years 
Relevant LL 1966 LL 1966 
instruments SOLAS 1974, SOLAS PROT 1978 SOLAS 1974 
 MARPOL 73/78 MARPOL 73/78 
 STCW 1978 STCW 1978 
 COLREG 1972 - COLREG 1972 
 TONNAGE 69 TONNAGE 69 
 ILO Convention No. 147 ILO Convention No. 147 
 - ships visiting a port of a State for the first time - ships visiting a port of a State for the first  
Inspection or after an absence of 12 months or more time or after an absence of 12 months or 
more 
priorities - ships which have been permitted to leave the - ships which have been permitted to leave  
 port of a State with deficiencies to be rectified the port of a State with deficiencies to be 
rectified 
 - ships which have been reported by pilots or - ships which have been reported by pilots or 
 port authorities as being deficient port authorities as being deficient 
 - ships whose certificates are not in order - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods
 - ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods not reporting all information 
 not reporting all information - ships suspended from class for safety  
 - ships suspended from class for safety  reasons in the course of the preceding  
 reasons in the course of the preceding  six months 
 six months - ships which have been subject of a report o 
  notification by another authority 
  -ships which have been: 
      .Involved in a collision, grounding or  
       stranding on their way to the port 
      .accused of an alleged violation of the  
        provisions on discharge of harmful 
         substances or effluents 
       . maneuvered in an erratic or unsafe 
         manner whereby routing measures, 
         adopted by the IMO, or safe navigation 
         practices and procedures have not been 
          followed, or 
         . otherwise operated in such a manner     
           as to cause a danger to persons,  
           property or the environment 
Amendments will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
will take effect 60 days after acceptance or at 
the end of any different  period determined 
unanimously by the representatives of the 
authorities in the Committee 
Information MOWCA Headquarters, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire Black Sea Information System(BSIS),  
Centre  Novorossiysk, Russian Federation 
Committee a representative of each of the authorities a representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat Lagos, Nigeria Istanbul, Turkey 
 Mrs. B.O. Williams  
 Director, Maritime Services Department  
 Federal Ministry of Transport  
 Federal Secretariats Complex  
 Abuja, Nigeria  
 Tel: +234 9 523 0879  Fax: +234 9 523 3705  
Signed 22 October 1999 7 April 2000 
Official English, French  
languages   
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Appendix E. 
 
Paris MOU structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maritime 
Authorities 
European 
Commissio
Co-operating 
Maritime Authorities
Observers: IMO, 
ILO, other MOUs 
Port State Control Committee 
SIReNaC Information System
Owners, flag States and 
classification societies 
Technical Working Groups 
Ship inspection services of 
Paris MOU port States 
MOU Advisory Board (MAB) 
Paris MOU Secretariat 
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Appendix F 
Paris MOU targeting factor 
The Paris MOU targeting factor is made up of two parts: generic, which was 
changed in year 2000 to increase dramatically the weighting given to poor flag 
performance, and historic, which is the history of the ship’s performance. 
The generic factor is made up of various elements and the weighting is given to 
flags considered to be very high risk.  These flags are now automatically awarded 20 
points, which make it the most significant element in this area. 
The historic factor, on the other hand, is primarily aimed at ships which have not 
been inspected, or which have a particularly bad record of inspection.  For instance a 
ship that has not been inspected in the last 12 months draws 20 points towards the 
target factor, and one which has, say 25 to 30 deficiencies receives 15.   
Port State control is criticized for inspecting too many good ships, which are 
generally lower target value ships.  It is also true that inspection of a bad ship will 
take longer than a well managed one.  There has to be some benefit to the port state 
control regime in inspecting high target factor ships.  Under the proposals discussed 
in May 2000, they will be credited with more than one inspection to count towards 
the 25 percent inspection commitment.  The advantage of carrying out an inspection 
on vessels whose target factor is 35 plus is a credit of 1.8 inspections for one actual 
inspection.   
The frequency of inspections is determined to some degree by the historic 
elements.  A vessel that has not been inspected for 12 months automatically draws 20 
points, one not inspected for six months automatically draws 10 points.  If it has 
outstanding deficiencies then clearly it needs to be re-inspected.  The UK is 
particularly keen to follow through outstanding deficiencies. 
With the latest change to the flag state targeting list and the increased value 
given to high-risk flags, the flag state is now one of the main drivers of the frequency 
of inspection.  While there has been some concentration on older tankers and gas 
carriers, the value given to a ship over 25 years of age  - three points on the generic 
scale, or to a ship of 20 years of age – one point, does not in fact make much 
difference.  The targeting system does not treat older ships as bad ships.   
The position with class is slightly more complicated in that clearly if a vessel is 
withdrawn from class it will almost certainly be subject to a priority inspection.  On 
the other hand, a ship classed with a classification society that is not EU recognized 
will only draw an additional five points.  All of these factors for the generic and 
historic elements are brought together to indicate the frequency of inspections.  
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 Table 5   Generic factor of Paris MOU targeting system 
Generic factor 
Element Target factor value 
3 year detention record above the allowable limit  
Flag of very high risk +20 
Flag of high risk +14 
Flag of medium to high risk  +8 
Flag of very medium risk +4 
Targeted ship type (subjected to expanded inspection) +5 
Non EU recognized class society +5 
Age of ship:>25 years +3 
21-24 years  +2 
13-20 years +1 
Not all conventions ratified  +1 
Class deficiency ratio above average +1 
 
Table 6  Historic factor of Paris MOU targeting system 
Historic factor 
Element Target factor value 
Not inspected in last 12 months +20 
Not inspected in last 6 months +10 
Detained  +15 
Number of deficiencies:  
0 -15 
1-5 0 
6-10 +5 
11-20 +10 
21+ +15 
Outstanding deficiencies +1 for each deficiency to be rectified before 
departure or next port of call 
 +1 for every two deficiencies with other specified 
conditions 
 -2 if all deficiencies rectified 
The inspection history over the last 12 months is added to the generic factor 
 
Source:  (Cubbin, 2000) 
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Appendix G 
 
United States Coast Guard Port State Control  
Quality Shipping Initiative  
 
1  The U.S. Coast Guard is pleased to submit a summary of Qualship 21, a new 
initiative to identify quality, foreign-flagged vessels, and provide them with incentives. 
 
Qualship 21, Quality Shipping for the 21st Century 
2  The number of substandard vessels in the United States waters has decreased, and 
a very small percentage of port State control exams result in a detention. While our 
targeting matrix appears to be effective in identifying the highest risk vessels for 
boarding and examination, Coast Guard policy requires all foreign-flagged vessels to be 
examined no less than once each year, regardless of the score that the vessel receives in 
the matrix. This provides few incentives for the well run, quality ship, and the United 
States believes that quality vessels should be recognized and rewarded for their 
commitment to safety and quality. Therefore, on 1 January 2001, the United States will 
implement an initiative to identify high-quality ships, and provide incentives to 
encourage quality operations. This initiative is called, Qualship 21, quality shipping for 
the 21st century. 
 
3  By closely examining port State control data from the previous 3 years, the 
characteristics of a typical quality vessel were identified. A quality vessel is associated 
with a well run company, is classed by an organization with a quality track record, is 
registered with a flag State with a superior port State control record, and has an 
outstanding port State control history in the United States waters. Using these general 
criteria, approximately 10% of the non-U.S. flagged vessels that call in the United States 
will qualify for this initiative. The specific eligibility criteria are as follows: 
1) The vessel may not have been detained, and determined to be substandard in 
the U.S. within the previous 3 years; 
2) The vessel may not have any marine violations (and no more than 1 Notice of 
Violation, also known as a ticket) in U.S. waters within the previous 3 years; 
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3) The vessel may not have had any major marine casualties or serious marine 
incidents in U.S. waters within the previous 3 years; 
4) The vessel must have completed a successful U.S. Port State Control 
examination within the previous 1 year; 
5) The vessel may not be owned or operated by any company that has been 
associated with a substandard vessel detention in the U.S. within 2 years; 
6) The vessel may not be classed by, nor have its statutory Convention 
Certificates issued by, a targeted class society. A class society is targeted if 
points are assigned in the Coast Guard’s port State control targeting matrix; 
7) The vessel must be registered with a flag State that has a detention ratio not 
more than 1/3 of the overall U.S. detention ratio (determined on a 3-year 
rolling average), and the flag State must have at least 10 U.S. distinct vessel 
arrivals in each of the last 3 years; 
8) The vessel’s flag State must submit its Self-Assessment of Flag State 
Performance to the IMO, and provide a copy to the Coast Guard; and 
9) Though not specifically mentioned in the above criteria, the Coast Guard 
reserves the right to restrict eligibility in the Qualship 21 initiative to any 
vessel because of special circumstances including, but not limited to, 
significant overseas casualties or detentions, and pending criminal or civil 
investigations 
 
4  To encourage quality vessel operations, all Qualship 21 vessels will receive a 
Qualship 21 Certificate, and the vessel’s name will be posted on the Qualship 21 page of 
the Coast Guard’s port State control internet web site. Qualship 21 vessels will also 
receive the following incentives: 
1) Freight ships will be eligible for a maximum of 2 years of limited port State 
control oversight. Annual exams of these vessels will be eliminated and 
replaced with biennial exams; 
2) Tank ships must still be examined annually, but the mid-period examination 
of a Qualship 21 tank vessel may be reduced in scope; and 
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3) Passenger vessels will not be eligible for a reduction in port State control 
exams. While passenger vessels have an excellent safety record in the United 
States, there is too much at risk to consider any changes to our passenger 
vessel examination policy. 
 
5 A vessel owner will not be required to apply for Qualship 21 designation. The 
Coast Guard will screen its vessel database, and develop a list of ships that appears to 
meet the Qualship 21 qualification criteria. Letters will be sent to the vessel owners to 
notify them of the initiative, and their opportunity to participate. To qualify for the 
original list, owners would be required to answer a series of questions to verify that our 
initial screening of the vessel was correct. 
 
6  The Qualship 21 vessel list will be published annually (with the first list published 
on 1 March 2001) on the Qualship 21 page of the headquarters port State control web 
site. Amendments will be made in the 2nd quarter of each calendar year, to add the 
vessels that were missed through the initial screening process. Input for the 2nd quarter 
amendment will come from vessel owners who believe they have vessels eligible for 
designation, yet their vessels were not published on the list. Additionally, the annual 
vessel list will be updated monthly when eligible vessels complete required PSC exams, 
and when subtractions to the list are made as vessels trigger exit criteria. 
 
7  To maintain the integrity of the program, and to protect the safety of U.S. ports, a 
Qualship 21 vessel will be removed from the program when it triggers the following exit 
criteria:  substandard detention in U.S. waters; marine violation, or more than 1 ticket; 
serious marine incident or major marine casualty; discovered in U.S. waters with serious 
deficiencies, or failed to report a hazardous condition to the Captain of the port; transfers 
class to a targeted class society; or changes registry to a flag State that has a detention 
ratio more than 1/3 of the overall port State control detention ratio, or to a flag State that 
has less than 10 distinct vessel arrivals ineach of the previous 3 years. 
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Appendix H 
 
Procedures for Port State Control 
 
(Resolution A.787(19), 
as amended by Resolution A.882(21)) 
 
 
CHAPTER 1- GENERAL 
 
1.1  PURPOSE 
 
This document is intended to provide basic guidance on the conduct of port State 
control inspections and afford consistency in the conduct of these inspections, the 
recognition of deficiencies of a ship, its equipment or its crew, and the application of 
control procedures. 
 
1.2  APPLICATION 
 
1.2.1  The procedures apply to ships which come under the provisions of the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS 
74), the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Protocol 1988), the International Convention on Load 
Lines, 1966 (Load Lines 66), the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International 
Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load Line Protocol 88), the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended (MARPOL 73/78), the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
1978, as amended (STCW 78), and the International Convention on Tonnage 
Measurement of Ships, 1969 (Tonnage 69), hereafter referred to as the applicable 
conventions. 
 
1.2.2 Ships of non-parties or below convention size shall be given no more 
favourable treatment (see section 1.5). 
 
1.2.3 In exercising port State control, Parties will only apply those provisions of the 
conventions which are in force and which they have accepted. 
 
1.2.4  If a port State exercises port State control based on International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 147, "Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1976", guidance on the conduct of such control inspections is given in 
the ILO publication "Inspection of Labour Conditions on board Ship: Guidelines for 
Procedure". 
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1.3  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.3.1  Under the provisions of the applicable conventions listed in section 1.2 above 
the Administration (i.e. the government of the flag State) is responsible for 
promulgating laws and regulations and for taking all other steps which may be 
necessary to give the applicable conventions full and complete effect so as to ensure 
that, from the point of view of safety of life and pollution prevention, a ship is fit for 
the service for which it is intended and seafarers are qualified and fit for their duties. 
 
1.3.2  In some cases it may be difficult for the Administration to exercise full and 
continuous control over some ships entitled to fly the flag of its State, for instance 
those ships which do not regularly call at a port of the flag State. The problem can 
be, and has been, partly overcome by appointing inspectors at foreign ports and/or 
authorizing recognized organizations to act on behalf of the flag State 
Administration. 
 
1.3.3  The following control procedures should be regarded as complementary to 
national measures taken by Administrations of flag States in their countries and 
abroad and are intended to provide assistance to flag State Administrations in 
securing compliance with convention provisions in safeguarding the safety of crew, 
passengers and ships, and ensuring the prevention of pollution. 
 
1.4  PROVISIONS FOR PORT STATE CONTROL 
 
Regulation 19 of chapter I, regulation 6.2 of chapter IX and regulation 4 of 
chapter XI of SOLAS 74, as modified by SOLAS Protocol 88; article 21 of Load 
Lines 66, as modified by Load Line Protocol 88; articles 5 and 6, regulation 8A of 
Annex I, regulation 15 of Annex II, regulation 8 of Annex III and regulation 8 of 
Annex V of MARPOL 73/78; article X of STCW 78; and article 12 of Tonnage 69 
provide for control procedures to be followed by a Party to a relevant convention 
with regard to foreign ships visiting their ports. The authorities of port States should 
make effective use of these provisions for the purposes of identifying deficiencies, if 
any, in such ship which may render them substandard (see 4.1), and ensuring that 
remedial measures are taken. 
 
1.5  SHIPS OF NON-PARTIES AND SHIPS BELOW CONVENTION SIZE 
 
1.5.1  Article II(3) of the Protocol of 1978 to SOLAS 74, article 5(4) of MARPOL 
73/78, and article X(5) of STCW 78, provide that no more favourable treatment is to 
be given to the ships of countries which are not Party to the Convention. All Parties 
should as a matter of principle apply the procedures set out in this document to ships 
of non-parties and ships below convention size in order to ensure that equivalent 
surveys and inspections are conducted and an equivalent level of safety and 
protection of the marine environment are ensured. 
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1.5.2  As ships of non-parties and ships below convention size are not provided 
with SOLAS, Load Line or MARPOL certificates, as applicable, or the crew 
members may not hold valid STCW certificates, the Port State Control Officer 
(PSCO), taking into account the principles established in this document, should be 
satisfied that the ship and crew do not present a danger to those on board or an 
unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. If the ship or crew has some 
form of certification other than that required by a convention, the PSCO may take the 
form and content of this documentation into account in the evaluation of that ship. 
The conditions of and on such a ship and its equipment and the certification of the 
crew and the flag State's minimum manning standards should be compatible with the 
aims of the provisions of the conventions; otherwise, the ship should be subject to 
such restrictions as are necessary to obtain a comparable level of safety and 
protection of the marine environment. 
 
1.6  DEFINITIONS 
 
1.6.1 Clear grounds: Evidence that the ship, its equipment, or its crew does not 
correspond substantially with the requirements of the relevant conventions or that the 
master or crew members are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating 
to the safety of ships or the prevention of pollution. Examples of clear grounds are 
included in section 2.3. 
 
1.6.2 Deficiency: A condition found not to be in compliance with the requirements 
of the relevant convention. 
 
1.6.3  Detention: Intervention action taken by the port State when the condition of 
the ship or its crew does not correspond substantially with the applicable conventions 
to ensure that the ship will not sail until it can proceed to sea without presenting a 
danger to the ship or persons on board, or without presenting an unreasonable threat 
of harm to the marine environment, whether or not such action will affect the normal 
schedule of the departure of the ship. 
 
1.6.4 Inspection: A visit on board a ship to check both the validity of the relevant 
certificates and other documents; and the overall condition of the ship, its equipment, 
and its crew. 
 
1.6.5  More detailed inspection: An inspection conducted when there are clear 
grounds for believing that the condition of the ship, its equipment, or its crew does 
not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificates. 
 
1.6.6 Port State Control Officer (PSCO): A person duly authorized by the 
competent authority of a Party to a relevant convention to carry out port State control 
inspections, and responsible exclusively to that Party. 
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1.6.7  Recognized Organization: An organization which meets the relevant 
conditions set forth by resolution A.739(18), and has been delegated by the flag State 
Administration to provide the necessary statutory services and certification to ships 
entitled to fly its flag. 
 
1.6.8 Stoppage of operation: Formal prohibition against a ship to continue an 
operation due to an identified deficiency(ies) which, singly or together, render the 
continuation of such operation hazardous. 
 
1.6.9  Substandard ship: A ship whose hull, machinery, equipment, or operational 
safety is substantially below the standards required by the relevant convention or 
whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document: 
 
1.6.10 Valid certificates: A certificate that has been issued directly by a Party to a 
relevant convention or on its behalf by a recognized organization and contains 
accurate and effective dates, meets the provisions of the relevant convention and with 
which the particulars of the ship, its crew and its equipment correspond. 
 
CHAPTER 2 - PORT STATE INSPECTIONS 
 
2.1  GENERAL 
 
2.1.1  In accordance with the provisions of the applicable conventions, Parties may 
conduct inspections by PSCOs of foreign ships in their ports. 
 
2.1.2 Such inspections may be undertaken on the basis of: 
.l  the initiative of the Party; 
 
.2 the request of, or on the basis of, information regarding a ship 
provided by another Party; or 
 
.3. information regarding a ship provided by a member of the crew, a 
professional body, an association, a trade union or any other individual with 
an interest in the safety of the ship, its crew and passengers, or the protection 
of the marine environment. 
 
2.1.3  Whereas Parties may entrust surveys and inspections of ships entitled to fly 
their own flag either to inspectors nominated for this purpose or to recognized 
organizations, they should be made aware that under the applicable conventions, 
foreign ships are subject to port State control, including boarding, inspection, 
remedial action, and by officers duly authorized by the port State. This authorization 
of PSCOs may be a general grant of authority or may be specific on a case-by-case 
basis. 
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2.1.4  All possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or 
delayed. If a ship is unduly detained or delayed, it should be entitled to compensation 
for any loss or damage suffered. 
 
2.2  INSPECTIONS 
 
2.2.1  In the pursuance of control procedures under the applicable conventions, 
which, for instance, may arise from information given to a port State regarding a 
ship, a PSCO may proceed to the ship and before boarding gain, from its appearance 
in the water, an impression of its standard of maintenance from such items as the 
condition of its paintwork, corrosion or pitting or unrepaired damage. 
 
2.2.2 At the earliest possible opportunity the PSCO should ascertain the year of 
build and size of the ship for the purpose of determining which provisions of the 
conventions are applicable. 
 
2.2.3  On boarding and introduction to the master or the responsible ship's officer, 
the PSCO should examine the vessel's relevant certificates and documents, as listed 
in Appendix 4. When examining 1969 International Tonnage Certificates, the PSCO 
should be guided by Appendix 4A. 
 
2.2.4  If the certificates are valid and the PSCO's general impression and visual 
observations on board confirm a good standard of maintenance, the PSCO should 
generally confine the inspection to reported or observed deficiencies, if any. 
 
2.2.5  If, however, the PSCO from general impressions or observations on board 
has clear grounds for believing that the ship, its equipment or its crew do not 
substantially meet the requirements, the PSCO should proceed to a more detailed 
inspection, taking into consideration chapter 3. 
 
2.2.6 In pursuance of control procedures under chapter IX of SOLAS74 on the 
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention (ISM Code), the PSCO should utilize the guidelines in section 3.7 
 
2.3 CLEAR GROUNDS 
 
"Clear grounds" to conduct a more detailed inspection include: 
 
. l  the absence of principal equipment or arrangements required by the 
conventions; 
 
.2 evidence from a review of the ship's certificates that a certificate or 
certificates are clearly invalid; 
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.3  evidence that documentation required by the Conventions and listed 
in appendix 4 is not on board, incomplete, not maintained or falsely 
maintained; 
 
.4 evidence from the PSCO's general impressions and observations that 
serious hull or structural deterioration or deficiencies exist that may place at 
risk the structural, watertight or weathertight integrity of the ship; 
 
.5 evidence from the PSCO's general impressions or observations that 
serious deficiencies exist in the safety, pollution prevention or navigational 
equipment; 
 
.6 information or .evidence that the master or crew is not familiar with 
essential shipboard operations relating to the safety of ships or the prevention 
of pollution, or that such operations have not been carried out; 
 
.7 indications that key crew members may not be able to communicate 
with each other or with other persons on board; 
 
.8  the emission of false distress alerts not followed by proper 
cancellation procedures; 
 
.9 receipt of a report or complaint containing information that a ship 
appears to be substandard. 
 
2.4  PROFESSIONAL PROFILE OF PSCOs 
 
2.4.1 Port State control should be carried out only by qualified PSCOs who fulfil 
the criteria specified in section 2.5. 
 
2.4.2 When the required professional expertise cannot be provided by the PSCO, 
the PSCO may be assisted by any person with the required expertise acceptable to 
the port State. 
 
2.4.3  The PSCOs and the persons assisting them should have no commercial 
interest, either in the port of inspection or in  the ships inspected, nor should PSCOs 
be employed by or undertake work on behalf of recognized organizations 
 
2.4.4 A PSCO should carry a personal document in the form of an identity card 
issued by the port State and indicating that the PSCO is authorized to carry out the 
control. 
 
2.5  QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF PSCOs 
 
2.5.1 The PSCO should be an experienced officer qualified as flag State surveyor. 
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2.5.2 The PSCO should be able to communicate in English with the key crew. 
 
2.5.3  Training should be provided for PSCOs to give the necessary knowledge of 
the provisions of the applicable conventions which are relevant to the conduct of port 
State control, taking into account the latest IMO Model Courses for port State 
control. 
 
2.5.4  In specifying the qualifications and training requirements for PSCOs, the 
Administration should take into account, as appropriate, which of the internationally 
agreed instruments are relevant for the control by the port State and the variety of 
types of ships which may enter its ports. 
 
2.5.5 PSCOs carrying out inspections of operational requirements should be 
qualified as: .a master or chief engineer and have appropriate seagoing experience, or 
have qualifications from an institution recognized by the Administration in a 
maritime related field and have specialized training to ensure adequate competence 
and skill, or be a qualified officer of the Administration with an equivalent level of 
experience and training, for performing inspections of the relevant operational 
requirements. 
 
2.5.6 periodical seminars for PSCOs should be held in order to update their 
knowledge with respect to instruments related to port State control. 
 
2.6  GENERAL PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR PSCOs 
 
2.6.1 The PSCO should us professional judgment in carrying out all duties, and 
consider consulting others as deemed appropriate. 
 
2.6.2  When boarding a ship, the PSCO should present to the master or to the 
representative of the owner, if requested to do so, the PSCO identity card. This card 
should be accepted as documented evidence that the PSCO in question is duly 
authorized by the Administration to carry out pert State control inspections. 
 
2.6.3  If the PSCO has clear grounds for carrying out a more detailed inspection, 
the master should be immediately informed of these grounds and advised that, if so 
desired, the master may contact the Administration or, as appropriate, the recognized 
organization responsible for issuing the relevant certificate and invite their presence 
on board. 
 
2.6.4 In the case that an inspection is initiated based on a report or complaint, 
especially if it is from a crew member, the source of the information should not be 
disclosed. 
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2.6.5  When exercising control, all possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship 
being unduly detained or delayed. It should be borne in mind that the main purpose 
of port State control is to prevent a ship proceeding to sea if it is unsafe or presents 
an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. The PSCO should 
exercise professional judgment to determine whether to detain a ship until the 
deficiencies are corrected or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies, having 
regard to the particular circumstances of the intended voyage. 
 
2.6.6  It should be recognized that all equipment is subject to failure and spares or 
replacement parts may not be readily available. In such cases, undue delay should not 
be caused if, in the opinion of the PSCO, safe alternative arrangements have been 
made. 
 
2.6.7 Where the grounds for detention are the result of accidental damage suffered 
on the  ship's voyage to a port, no detention order should be issued, provided that: 
.1 due account has been given to the convention requirements regarding 
notification to the flag State Administration, the nominated surveyor or the 
recognized organization  responsible for issuing the relevant certificate; 
 
.2 prior to entering a port, the master or company has submitted to the 
port State authority details on the circumstances of the accident and the 
damage suffered and information about the required notification of the flag 
State Administration; 
 
.3 appropriate remedial action, to the satisfaction of the port State 
authority, is being taken by the ship; and 
 
.4 the port State authority has ensured, having been notified of the 
completion of the remedial action, that deficiencies which were clearly 
hazardous to safety, health or environment have been rectified. 
 
2.6.8 Since detention of a ship is a serious matter involving many issues, it may be 
in the best interest of the PSCO to act with other interested parties. For example, the 
officer may request the owner s representatives to provide proposals for correcting 
the situation. The PSCO may also consider co-operating with the flag State 
Administration s representatives or recognized organization responsible for issuing 
the relevant certificates, and consulting them regarding their acceptance of the owner 
s proposals and their possible additional requirements. Without limiting the PSCO s 
discretion in any way, the involvement of other parties could result in a safer ship, 
avoid subsequent arguments relating to the circumstances of the detention, and prove 
advantageous in the case of litigation involving "undue delay."  
 
2.6.9 Where deficiencies cannot be remedied at the port of  inspection, the PSCO 
may allow the ship to proceed to another port,  subject to any appropriate conditions 
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determined. In such  circumstances, the PSCO should ensure that the competent 
authority  of the next port of call and the flag State are notified.  
 
2.6.10 Detention reports to the flag State should be in sufficient  detail for an 
assessment to be made of the severity of the deficiencies  giving rise to the detention.  
 
2.6.11  The company or its representative have a right of appeal against a detention 
taken by the Authority of a port State. The appeal should not cause the detention to 
be suspended. The PSCO should properly inform the master of the right of appeal. 
 
2.6.12 To ensure of consistent enforcement of port State control  requirements, 
PSCOs should carry an extract of 2.6 (General Procedural Guidelines for PSCOs) for 
ready reference when carrying  out any port State control inspections.  
 
